Deregulating the Norwegian railway: a survey of empirical experiences abroad by Røstadli, Caroline
 
 
DEREGULATING THE 
NORWEGIAN RAILWAY 
A Survey of Empirical Experiences Abroad 
Caroline Røstadli 
Supervisor: Lasse B. Lien 
Master of Science Thesis in Economics and Business Administration 
Energy, Natural Resources and The Environment  
Department of Strategy and Management 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are 
responsible − through the approval of this thesis − for the theories and methods used, or results 
and conclusions drawn in this work. 
Norwegian School of Economics  
Bergen, autumn 2015 
 
 2
 
There is nothing wrong with change 
If it is in the right direction 
-Winston Churchill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
Executive Summary 
Portraying implications of deregulation, this thesis presents an extensive review of 
deregulation in the European railway. It targets various decision variables concerning the 
introduction of competitive tendering in the rail industry. This thesis attempts to take a 
pragmatic stand offering an improved understanding vis-à-vis on decisions that have yet to be 
made, concentrating on possible competition forms, auction designs and contract designs. It 
offers learning points and trade-offs that can help improve decision-making. One key learning 
point is that the introduction of competitive tendering has typically increased efficiency. 
However, this is made more problematic if the operating companies are obliged to take over 
staff at current wages and conditions. Issues concerning opportunistic behaviour and the 
winner’s curse appear to be present in many competitive tendering of rail franchises in Europe. 
Government’s willingness to renegotiate contracts increases the propensity of opportunistic 
behaviour. Furthermore, the risk of the winner’s curse is higher in initial rounds. Available 
information empowers sound assumptions, which can reduce this risk. Auctions are commonly 
used together with elements resembling Beauty Contests. As Beauty Contests are politically 
controversial and can lead to a less efficient supplier winning the franchise, the criteria and 
their weighting should be specified and made available to all potential bidders. A final key 
finding in this thesis is that management contracts are harmful for efficiency. Certain decisions 
represent trade-offs, where the regulator does best by evaluating the options based on the 
primary objectives he want to accomplish. Competition in the market can be used 
supplementary to competitive tendering, but it may come at the price of higher unit costs for 
each operator. The chance of the winner’s curse is reduced by allowing firms to observe each 
other’s behaviour; however, this increases the chances of collusion between the firms. The 
number of criteria specified before an auction need to be evaluated against ensuring an 
acceptable standard on the one hand, and on the other, avoid micro-management. Net contracts 
encourage mostly improved commercial effort, whereas gross contracts result in improved 
productive effort. Contract duration need to be balanced between desires to keep costs low, 
competition high and encourage investment. Finally, contract size is determined by the want 
to exploit scale economies on the one hand, and on the other to allow for more competition. 
The various findings outlined imply that aligned decisions may enable fulfilment of the 
government’s primary objectives of the deregulation. 
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Preface 
I have chosen to include a quote from Churchill at the beginning of my thesis. It is a powerful 
quote, which like many of his statements is not only true, but also addresses the related 
concerns and includes a tint of wit. Managers, shareholders, CEOs, academics etc. can easily 
speak about the importance of change. It is an unspoken agreement that we all view change as 
something good – if you show resistance to change, you can easily be stigmatized as a 
reactionary person. Nonetheless, chance has never been be synonymous with good. Change 
can be good. Churchill reminds us of that critical distinction. The future deregulation of NSB 
has provoked some resistance, and will probably provoke more when it becomes a reality. One 
question many might ask is whether the deregulation is a good idea or not. I have come to 
realise that deregulation is just a catalyst for change. Deregulation, the direction Churchill 
spoke of, cannot guarantee whether the outcome will be better or worse than status quo in this 
case. My research review demonstrates that the success of deregulation is not determined by 
the European governments’ decisions to initiate deregulations through public-private 
partnerships. Instead, it is determined by how the authorities use the tools available when they 
tender the railway service. For me, this implies that the critical decisions lies ahead, and not 
behind us. The authority must assess what variables to use when tendering rail services. The 
advantage that the Norwegian government holds is that there is a vast amount of theoretical 
and empirical research out there in the world already. Every human being knows that learning 
from past mistakes is a powerful mechanism for making improved decisions in the future. 
Hence, let Norway use previous mistakes and previous victories to make sound decisions. This 
thesis aspires to analyse some of the more relevant empirical experience out there, and use 
theory to understand the underlying drivers better. As such, I hope that it can help to make 
more sound decisions, both through providing key learning points and by presenting key trade-
offs that the decision-makers will have to evaluate. I would like to extend my gratitude to 
Lasse Lien, who has been an indispensable and inspiring discussion partner. He has helped me 
to find method in the chaotic and hardly surmountable mountain of empirical research. I am 
also indebted to my mum, for once again being another of my thought-provoking discussion 
partners. 
 
 
Bergen, 21st of December, 2015      Caroline Røstadli 
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1. Introduction 
Substantial reforms in the railway sector have characterised several of European countries in 
the last 20 to 25 years. The railway sector had hitherto been characterised by a steady decline 
in market share in the overall transportation sector. Concurrently, subsidy transfers required 
to operate the railway services were climbing.  
Sweden was the first country to initiate reforms in the 1980s. Infrastructure and operations 
were separated and competitive tendering was introduced on some routes. In Britain, 
infrastructure and operations were separated in the 1990s. Contrary to Sweden, all routes were 
competitively tendered. The previous state-owned British Rail (BR) was initially prohibited 
from taking part in the auctioning of the franchises and eventually ceased to exist. Germany 
chose a different path altogether with Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) being established as a holding 
company, with separate passenger, freight and infrastructure subsidiaries. New operators were 
allowed to access the rail market through either open access or franchising (Nash, 2008).  
Simultaneously, the European Union recognised a need to reform the railway industry in order 
to deliver cost efficient, high quality, market-oriented services. The European Community 
adopted Council Directive 91/440 on the development of the Community’s railways. The 
purpose was to increase efficiency in parallel to making the various railway industries apt to 
serve the needs of the Single Market. The Directive stipulated the necessity for accounting the 
management of railway infrastructure separately from operations of railway transport services. 
Serving as a minimum reform, there is no requirement for any Member State to split 
infrastructure and operation into two or more separate business entities. Notwithstanding, 
many European countries opted to do so (Profillidis, 2001).  
In 1996, the holding company NSB was divided into Jernbaneverket, a railroad infrastructure 
entity, and NSB BA, an operating entity. This marked the latest fundamental change in the 
organisational structure of the Norwegian railway. To this day, both Jernbaneverket and NSB 
BA are state-owned corporations.  
To date, Gjøviksbanen is the only experience with competitive tendering in Norway. NSB 
Gjøviksbanen AS won the right to operate the service in 2005. In 2014, the Conservative 
government commenced a railway reform “På rett spor” (“On the right track”) to eradicate 
NSB’s existing monopoly on routes in Norway, and to restructure the Norwegian rail system’s 
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operations and lines of responsibility. A new train system directorate will be granted the future 
responsibility for procuring train services, streamlining the ticketing system and planning 
routes. NSB will remain state-owned; notwithstanding, it will have to compete with other 
suppliers of rail services. A new state-owned infrastructure authority will assume the 
responsibility of train line expansions, railroad real estate, maintenance and operations of 
current infrastructure (På rett spor: Reform av jernbanesektoren, 2015). 
1.1 Justifying the Review 
Experiences in competitive tendering and deregulation of the railway industry have 
accumulated over the years. Norway can benefit greatly from these experiences, if made 
available in a comprehensive manner. The vast amount of assorted models, however, makes 
collecting and interpreting a demanding task. No unique model has been singled out as the 
correct way to advance railway efficiencies or ensure superior customer services. Scholars 
disagree or find conflicting results on same or similar case studies, which make the already 
complex picture even more perplexing. It is greatly beneficial to break apart the research 
already completed to study the various components in the deregulation of the European rail 
industries. The practical and contemporary aspect put aside, there are numerous justifications 
to investigate the theoretical and empirical experience of deregulation in Europe.  
In economics, politics and the wider society, there are few issues as heavily disputed as the 
degree to which the state should intervene in markets. A broad consensus has emerged that 
neither a pure free market economy nor a fully state controlled economy promote optimal 
efficiency. The focus has been redirected from polarized arguments toward a more 
sophisticated debate, questioning to which degree the state should intervene, in what 
industries, when and by what means.  
The rail industry makes a remarkably curious case study. Neither the government nor the 
private sector seemed to be particularly successful at operating rail services. On the one hand, 
the railway appeared to have been operated at a less than optimal efficiency level in Europe, 
with rising costs and declining market share. As such, having a state-owned monopoly 
operator became increasingly unpopular. A widely held belief amongst governments and 
scholars was that the private sector would be able to exploit resources more effectively and 
be more equipped to address customer needs. On the other hand, rail markets are particularly 
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prone to market failures. Firstly, the rail industry is heavily dependent on state funding. 
Secondly, the huge investment costs associated with owning infrastructure, real estate and 
rolling stock lead to operators reaping significant market power.  
If neither the state nor the private sector is anywhere near optimal owners and operators of the 
railway, multifaceted issues need to be appraised, resolved and balanced. How should the 
railway industry be regulated to ensure both control and stimulation of the market forces to 
drive innovation and efficiencies without compromising passenger safety and/or the service 
level? Striking a balance between the market and regulation to minimise both regulatory and 
market failures is of relevance to all industries. The rail industry, however, highlight some key 
challenges with both the free market and state interventions.  
Competitive and contestable market theories are also particularly relevant to study in the 
railroad setting. In contrast to many other markets, the rail industry is characterised by a 
majority of tracks that allow for only one operator at any given time. In Norway, it is 
predominantly impossible to achieve competition side-by-side due to infrastructure 
restrictions. As of 2011, under 6% of the tracks where double to allow more train capacity at 
any given time (Jernbaneverket, 2011). Network externalities and huge scale economics 
related to infrastructure, real estate etc. favour one operator, whilst competitive market theory 
may favour many operators or at least the opportunity for any operator to establish itself 
profitably in the market.  
Most commonly, public-private partnerships through competitive tendering of passenger and 
possibly freight operations were introduced to advance efficiencies. In light of this, some 
additional concerns arise that proves the rail industry once again an interesting subject to study.  
Risk allocation between the public and private sector can be challenging to determine. The rail 
industry effectively exemplifies this, as much of the risk, delegated or retained by the 
government, is outside both parties control. Passengers’ growth has much to do with 
population growth and socio-economic changes such as urbanisation. The government must 
choose how to allocate risk to incentivise compliance with the contract, which is proven 
difficult, when so little risks are inside the rail operators’ control. The risk allocation needs to 
be assessed jointly with other aspects of auction theory and contract theory, and empirical 
experience within these fields. 
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Issues such as winner’s curse, collusion and moral hazard1 are problems often evaluated in 
relation to public-private partnerships in general and in the rail industry in particular. There is 
still a need to evaluate the consequences pragmatically and comprehensively, so that the 
experiences can be used to improve decision-making in the deregulation of the Norwegian 
railway.  
1.2 Problem Formulation  
The government’s intention with the reform is to make the railway a strategic component in 
solving the overall transportation issues Norway is expected to face in the years to come. The 
railway will remain a state responsibility, with the intent that exposure to competition will 
increase customer focus. Furthermore, an objective is that the industry should be increasingly 
characterised by long-term goals that drive the development of the railway. Additionally, the 
rail industry should continue to be a safe solution for customers and employees. The 
government aim to achieve a strong coordination between the public and private sector, 
granting firms operational autonomy, though ensuring that they are appropriately regulated. 
In short, the government aims to increase overall social welfare by exposing the industry to 
competition and allowing operators more autonomy, yet retaining the overall responsibility 
for the railway (På rett spor: Reform av jernbanesektoren, 2015). 
There are certain elements in the reform that are already determined. There will be competitive 
tendering of train operating franchises, though it remains to investigate if this should be 
supplemented by in-market competition through open access operators. Furthermore, what the 
infrastructure authority and the rail directorate are responsible for are settled. NSB, the current 
state monopolist, will continue to compete with other firms for franchises.  
This thesis takes a pragmatic stand in the debate, and does not elaborate extensively on matters 
that are already concluded. Nevertheless, elements that are settled might be raised in order to 
enlighten other unresolved issues.  
                                                 
1 Winner’s curse accounts for how the winning bid may often be an overly optimistic bid that results in losses or near zero 
profit for the operator. Collusion explains how firms agreeing, explicitly or implicitly to bid less aggressively on franchises. 
Moral hazard rationalises for example why firms might bid strategically, submitting low bids but then renegotiating a more 
favourable contract later. 
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Firstly, given that the majority, or all, of the competition will be through the franchising of 
contracts, a crucial aspect to address is how competitive tendering of rail services has 
improved efficiency. Secondly, the thesis must investigate how the auctioning processes can 
be designed to ensure that the right operators are selected. Thirdly, the issue of contract design 
needs to be addressed to understand how operators can be correctly incentivised to operate 
efficiently. Finally, the thesis will debate whether competition in the market should 
supplement competition for the market. Together, these decision variables will undoubtedly 
influence the outcome of the railway franchising. The objective of the thesis will be to address 
the following two questions: 
I. What have been the outcomes of the deregulation of the railway industry in relevant 
European countries, concerning auction characteristics, contract design and 
competition form?  
II. How can the Rail Directorate make use of the above mentioned experience to shape 
the auctioning process and design contracts to increase customer value and/or 
improve cost efficiencies and to develop competition for (and possibly in) the 
market? 
1.3 Metodology and Thesis Structure 
The thesis will consist of a theoretical and empirical evaluation of the various decision 
variables determined by the thesis questions and the overall objective of the thesis. As such, 
the thesis will be a qualitative collection and evaluation of various studies on the European 
railway industries. Consequently, the thesis makes use of secondary and tertiary data only. 
The analysis will aim to decompose the various elements to understand the impact of the 
various decision variables. The primary value of this thesis is to understand how various 
variables influence the outcome of the deregulation and the competitive tendering of 
franchises with respect to cost efficiencies and/or quality of services offered to the public. The 
thesis uses a strategic, rather than a normative approach as such.  
There are vast amounts of research articles on the topic of rail privatisation, to some extent 
with assorted opinions, findings and conclusions. To navigate through the labyrinth of 
research, the thesis will commence with a theoretical outline of the various decision variables 
and a basic understanding of how markets and state intervention sometimes work flawlessly, 
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but fail profoundly at other times. The theoretical literature review and the empirical findings 
will be bridged by theory relating directly to the rail industry. With a thorough theoretical 
foundation, the thesis will proceed to untangle the nest of research.  
Nonetheless, there are some limitations to what research is included in this thesis. The 
empirical review will include findings from a number of European countries, with particularly 
attention to the UK and Sweden. These countries where the first to introduce competitive 
tendering, offering years of experience and data academics have analysed. Both countries have 
chosen to separate the owner of the infrastructure company from the different operating 
franchises, which for examples Germany has not. In Germany, DB still owns the infrastructure 
as well as operates various routes. The Norwegian government has decided that the state 
should retain the responsibilities of the infrastructure. The majority of U.S. railroads are 
centred on freight, which differs from European railways in general that traditionally involve 
both passenger and freight operations.  
The UK and Sweden have chosen to some degree different solutions. Sweden still has a 
dominant operator, SJ, whereas BR was not initially permitted to bid for franchises, and ceased 
to exist. In Sweden, the contracts have usually been gross contracts, whereas the UK has 
utilised net contracts. This allows for observations of various results with respect to different 
aspects of auction and contract design. 
Finally, the thesis will summarize the key findings from the review. Most elements in the 
franchising process will have advantages and disadvantages, and there is no universal, optimal 
model for the deregulation of the rail industry. The conclusions will be divided into key 
learning point and key trade-offs. The trade-offs illustrate that the regulating authority will 
have to decide what outcomes are a priority in any given period. Some ambiguousness will 
remain nonetheless, as there are circumstances that influence the decision variables that are 
not reviewed in this thesis, mainly due to the lack of research on the topic.  
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2. Theory 
2.1 Market Failure and Regulatory Failure 
2.1.1 Perfect competition as a benchmark for “successful” 
markets 
A perfectly competitive market is an apposite mechanism to achieve economic efficiency: For 
any given level of effort (cost), the largest possible benefit is obtained. Hence, a relevant 
starting point to understand any government intervention (or objections to such) would be to 
understand the perfect competition model and the underlying market mechanisms. This is 
because perfect competition upholds economic efficiency. Economic efficiency can be broken 
down to two broad areas: Efficiency in production and efficiency in allocation. Productive 
efficiency involves the minimization of unit costs of production and the utilisation of 
economics of scale and scope. Allocative efficiency, on the other hand, concerns the quantity 
produced and consumed. When the cost of producing the last unit equals the value of that unit 
to the last consumer, the good is allocated efficiently (Duff, 1997). 
Goods and resources are limited relative to human needs and desires. Competition is one of 
several ways to distribute scarce resources. The idea behind perfect competition is that goods 
will be rationed based on peoples’ willingness and ability to pay for these. The model is based 
on a set of assumptions that appears, and in many cases have been proven unrealistic or 
outright wrong. There are countless of examples where markets fail, in which case welfare 
economics advocate government intervention to improve and correct for the free market’s 
shortcomings (Duff, 1997). 
Perfect competition assumes that the economy consists of many independent producers and 
consumers. The reasoning behind this assumption is that no single actor is sufficiently 
powerful to influence market outcomes by their own actions. In other words, every participant 
in the market is a price-taker. Therefore, the perfect competition model assumes that neither 
producers nor consumers have market power. If a producer would have had market power, she 
could choose to hold back supplies in order to increase prices and hence increase profit. In 
scenarios, the market equilibria would not have achieved economic efficiency. There would 
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be consumers in the market willing to pay for the good or service at a price above the average 
cost of producing it, though they would not be given such an opportunity. Put differently, the 
producers would be able to sell the goods or services at a price above or equal to the average 
costs, however, they would not be willing to sell it. This is not an economically efficient 
outcome as it breaches at minimum the conditions for allocative efficiency. Therefore, the 
absence of market power is a vital assumption to the perfect competition model. 
Furthermore, the model assumes that all individuals and firms are rational and driven by self-
interest. Individual consumers seek to maximise their level of utility, and each individual’s 
utility is independent of others, whilst firms seek to maximise profit. Seeking to maximise 
profit, firms will strive to produce at the lowest cost. As the average cost of production falls, 
the price falls, and more consumers will be able to obtain the product. When costs are at the 
lowest possible level, i.e. when there is no feasible way to reduce costs any further, economic 
efficiency is achieved.  
Additionally, the model assumes that there is a market-clearing price in each market. This 
occurs when the quantity of supply equals that of the quantity in demand. Put differently, the 
prices in perfect competition balance the conflicting forces of supply and demand. Excess 
supply will drive prices down, whereas excess demand will raise prices. This can only work 
when firms enter and exit the market freely, which is assumed to be the case in perfect 
competition. If demand exceeds supply, prices are driven up, which leaves room for excess 
profit. Firms that are currently not in the market will be incentivised by the excess profit to 
enter the market, which will increase the supply and drive prices down until demand equals 
supply. The goods sold in the market are assumed homogeneous so that consumers are 
indifferent between the goods given that the price is the same.  
Finally, the model assumes perfect information (and knowledge), and no government 
interventions (Duff, 1997). Perfect information implies that anything that impact consumers 
or producers’ decision process is known and understood. Otherwise, the party with the better 
information has a competitive advantage, and can use this. Hence, asymmetric information is 
harmful for efficiency, and can lead to adverse selection and/or moral hazard. The difference 
between the two is that adverse selection occurs when there is a lack of symmetric information 
prior to a deal between two parties, whereas with moral hazard the behaviour of one party 
changes after a deal is finalised. The thesis will explore the issues of adverse selection and 
moral hazard in auction and contract design theory.  
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There are few to none examples of a perfectly competitive market. Markets fail, for various 
reasons, and in such cases, welfare economists favour government interventions. The 
following section describes some of the reasons why markets fail. 
2.1.2 Why markets fail; the need for regulation  
The perfect competition model has been heavily criticized for having little to no empirical 
justifications. At best, it seems farfetched to believe that all assumptions baked in the perfect 
competition model are satisfied. Governments are considered by many to be essential in order 
to correct market failures, through taxes, subsidies and regulations (Stiglitz, 2009).  
Some goods differ from “regular” goods by their non-excludability and non-rivalry. These 
public goods introduce the problem of free-riding: Individuals can consume a public good that 
others have paid for. Because of their non-excludability, public goods are impossible to 
exclude from individuals once made available. One example that approximates the properties 
of a public good is a lighthouse. Once it is provided, it will be impossible to exclude other 
boats from benefiting from the lighthouse, and within reason, it will be no rivalry of 
consumption. The market mechanisms fail to assign sufficient resources to provide the public 
goods, relative to social utility, and hence it is usually the governments’ role to allocate 
resources for those goods and services (Cornes & Sandler, 1986).  
Public goods are special cases of a market failure. Market failures, in general, arise when the 
price mechanism is unable to take account of the full social costs and benefits of production 
and consumption. Externalities are defined as third party spill-over effects from the production 
and/or consumption of goods and services. When the externality is not included in the cost of 
production (and hence reflected in the price), it causes a market failure. This occurs 
independently of whether the externality brings about socially desirable effects or causes 
damages. Free-riding, as discussed above, is a special case of an externality. Once produced, 
it provides positive spill-over effects to third parties that can benefit from those without any 
effort. When externalities are present, a mismatch occurs between the socially optimal level 
of consumption, and private consumption (Cornes & Sandler, 1986). 
The perfect competition model assumes that both buyers and sellers are price takers; 
nevertheless, there are markets where firms hold market power. This can arrive from exclusive 
control over inputs, patents and copyrights, economics of scale, and network economics. These 
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elements raise the barriers to enter, so that entry (and exit) from the market is made difficult, 
contradicting assumptions made in the perfect competition model. When potential entrants are 
inhibited from entering the market, producers can make excess profit without being concerned 
about attracting new competitors (Duff, 1997). 
Firms with market power tend to exploit this to increase prices (and hence profit) by restricting 
output. They are no longer price takers, but price givers. Fewer consumers will be able and 
willing to buy the goods and services than in a socially optimal equilibrium, making the market 
inefficient in allocation (Duff, 1997). 
Firms can have varying degrees of market power. In some markets, there are only a few 
suppliers, possibly only one or two, whereas in some markets, there might be only one big 
producer with small “fringe” competitors. It might also be that the products are sufficiently 
differentiated, so that the different products are not perfect substitutes. In such cases, the 
producers know that their customers “lose” some utility from switching producers, thus the 
market is characterised by differentiated prices (Duff, 1997). 
Collusion is one way for firms to exploit the collective market power they have, where two or 
more firms agree to restrict output. In horizontal price-fixing, producers agree to constrict 
supply and thereby raise price (Leslie, 1993). Explicit collusion, i.e. firms directly (explicitly) 
discuss prices with each other, is illegal in most jurisdiction. Hence, antitrust laws exist to 
prevent firms that engage in such cartel activities. Nonetheless, collusion can also be implicit, 
i.e. that firms reach implicit agreements to restrict output and hence raise prices and profits 
(Fonseca & Normann, 2012).  
Alternatively, in the case of competitive tendering, firms may agree not to actively bid (or to 
submit low bids) on certain contracts. In 1999, Germany sold ten blocks of spectrum by 
simultaneous ascending auction. This means that no block could be sold until all parties had 
stopped submitting bids for any of the objects. In such an auction, all participants could 
observe each other’s behaviour. It was determined that any new bid on a block had to surpass 
the preceding bid by at least 10 per cent. There were only two credible bidders, Mannesmann 
and T-Mobile. Mannesmann’s opening bids for the ten blocks were 18.18 million 
deutschmarks (DM) per megahertz (MHz) on the first five blocks and 20 million DM per MHz 
on the last five. Effectively, that signalled to T-Mobile to bid 20 million DM per MHz on 
blocks one to five (i.e. approximately 10% higher than the current bid by Mannesmann), and 
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not continue to bid for the final five blocks (Jehiel & Moldovanu, 2003). A manager at T-
Mobile said that "No, there were no agreements with Mannesmann. But Mannesmann’s first 
bid was a clear offer."2  
Tacit collusion is more frequent in certain markets and auction forms. If firms are relatively 
confident that the threat of entry is absent, collusion becomes an attractive alternative. They 
know that even if firms are attracted by the excess profit in the market, entry is difficult. On 
the other hand, a significant obstacle to collusive behaviour is undetected or “secret” price-
cutting amongst the colluding firms. Firms generally benefit from selling more, at the expense 
of other cartel members reducing their quantity. The problem arises as each firm benefits from 
increasing its own supply, given that the other firms continue to restrict their output. Hence, 
tacit collusion is more probable when there are measures to monitor behaviour in the market 
and it is possible to retaliate deviating members (Stigler, 1964). This will be discussed in 
further detail in section 2.3.  
In some cases, there is only one supplier with no close substitutes, i.e. a monopoly supplier. 
This is the polar case to perfect competition. Monopolies enjoy great market power, and have 
the ability to set prices by restricting supply. They are generally considered undesirable, due 
to the effects on efficiency and business incentives. The ability to obtain substantial profits 
solely by being the exclusive provider may reduce incentives to increase efficiency and 
improve operations. Even though cost reducing initiatives, or innovations that increases 
consumers’ willingness to pay, would increase profit, the already comfortable profit reduces 
the sense of urgency to act (Posner, 1968).  
There are cases of natural monopolies, in which the characteristics of the industry makes it 
economically beneficial to have one, and not more, firms. A market where one operating firm 
reaches the minimal average cost at an output level that is large enough to satisfy the entire 
market, at a profitable price, is indeed a market for a natural monopolist. If more firms would 
enter the market, each must produce at a higher average cost level (Isaac & Smith, 1984).  
A sustainable equilibrium occurs when the quantity supplied and the market prices discourage 
entry to the industry. Still, the monopolist would be able to protect itself from entry even in a 
                                                 
2 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 29, 1999, p.13 
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non-sustainable equilibrium solution, by changing its prices whenever and however needed, 
at any moment, in response to threats of entry (Baumol, Bailey & Willig, 1977).  
Natural monopolies are often related to economies of scale. Large economies of scale are a 
common characteristic of natural monopolies. In such cases, an incumbent serving the entire 
market benefit to such a degree from lower average unit costs that entry is unprofitable (Isaac 
& Smith, 1984). Even if it would have been profitable, it increases the average costs for the 
incumbent and the new entrant, as neither could exploit the scale economies as completely as 
they could being alone in the market. 
Thus, even if both chose to operate and could have done so profitably, the condition for 
efficiency in production would be breached. Often sighted examples of natural monopolies 
include public utilities, such as water services and electricity.  
Baumol (1977) found that “scale economies are neither necessary nor sufficient for monopoly 
to be the least costly form of productive organization” (p. 807). Essentially, a natural 
monopoly implies strict subadditivity of the cost function, which is not accurately equated 
with scale economies. Strict subadditivity means that the cost of the sum of any output vector 
is less than the sum of costs when producing these outputs separately. Put differently, the 
average costs will fall as output increases. Still, natural monopolies often arise when there are 
significant scales economics present. In order to address the thesis questions, it is sufficient to 
understand how economies of scale could potentially lead to a natural monopoly solution. 
Government intervene in markets to overcome market failures such as those elaborated in this 
section. Governments can chose to correct for market failures by using “market based” 
interventions, i.e. taxes and subsidies, or through direct regulations. Both types of government 
interventions will be elaborated in the following paragraphs.  
Market based interventions are types of regulation that attempts to steer behaviour through 
market signals, as opposed to explicit regulations. These instruments aim to drive firms or 
individuals to act in a manner that is in their own self-interest, simultaneously as it drives 
behaviour that is socially desirable (Stiglitz, 2009).  
If successfully designed and implemented, market based intervention through taxation or 
subsidies ensure that the desired level of output is produced by the firms at the lowest overall 
cost for society. This can be utilized as a method of ‘forcing’ producers to clean up production, 
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thus reducing pollution. Firms able to reduce emissions at the lowest possible costs will have 
the highest incentives to do so, whereas if this would be costly, firms could rather pay the 
additional tax (Stavins, 2003). Similarly, governments can provide subsidies to producers that 
enable them to deliver goods and services. The difference between the two lies in the nature 
of the incentives, i.e. whether the government uses a carrot (rewards “good” behaviour) or a 
stick (punishes “poor” behaviour). The other difference is the impact it has on government 
revenues and expenditures. Taxes will necessarily mean a new government revenue stream, 
whereas a subsidy will be an additional cost to the public budget.  
Regulation (non-market based) can be separated into three different forms: information 
requirements, proscriptions and mandates. Proscriptions are restrictions; things firms may not 
do, whereas mandates are requirements, things firms must do (Stiglitz, 2009). All three will 
be elaborated in further detail below. 
Markets cannot thrive when information is distorted and imperfect, which was discussed in 
section 2.1.1. The objective of information requirements is to amend the resource allocation 
through improved information. However, there are some complex issues associated with the 
design of disclosure requirements. The information can be misinterpreted by uninformed 
individuals or firms that read the information disclosed. One example is the Miles per Gallon 
Illusion (MGP Illusion) researched by Larrick and Soll (2008). Because of the non-linear 
relationship between miles per gallon and gas consumption, consumers underestimate the 
effects of replacing least efficient cars, and overestimate the benefits of fuel saving of most 
efficient cars. A graphical illustration of the relationship can be found in appendix 6.1. 
Understandably, requirements are only effective if they ensure that the relevant information is 
communicated and that the information is conveyed in ways that are understood by consumers.  
Although disclosure requirements may appear less invasive than other regulatory measures, it 
faces the issue that disclosure in itself does not necessarily address all relevant market failures. 
On the one hand, stakeholders (suppliers, regulators, customers etc) do not always know how 
to interpret the information, which was identified as an issue in the paragraph above. On the 
other hand, some firms may disclose wrong information to stakeholder or take advantage of 
stakeholders that remain uninformed. The recent Volkswagen (VW) case illustrates how the 
car manufacturer “cheated” mandated US emissions testing, by installing a software that 
would turn on the full emission controls only during the testing procedure. Once discovered, 
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it made major headlines as it violated both government jurisdiction3 and consumer trust. 
Appendix 6.2. shows some examples of the press articles released in regards of the recent 
scandal. This thesis will later explore in detail how comparative tenders, i.e. auctions that 
include qualitative aspects, are vulnerable to information manipulation.  
The problems related to information disclosure demonstrate why proscriptions and mandates 
are other important regulatory measures. Proscriptions are the most direct restrictions on 
behaviour. An example relates to the previous discussion concerning collusion: Firms are not 
allowed to collude when determining prices. A common challenge concerning proscriptions 
on behaviour is that the regulator cannot perfectly monitor behaviour. However, regulators 
can observe where there might be distorted incentives. For example, preferably regulators 
would like to prohibit firms from anti-competitive practices; however, if restrictions are 
imposed directly at certain anti-competitive practices, the monopolies will just be incentivised 
to find new ways to act anti-competitively. It is arguably more effective to impose restrictions 
that influence incentives, i.e. structural remedies, such as limiting the scope of patents or 
dividing the monopoly or oligopoly firms. Therefore, regulators often focus on factors that 
affect behaviours, rather than the behaviours themselves (Stiglitz, 2009).  
Finally, mandates are used to accomplish public purposes without using public expenditure. 
A government can for example chose to introduce health mandates, demanding all firms to 
offer health insurance to their employees. It is possible to view mandates as a hidden form of 
taxation (Stiglitz, 2009). As such, critics claim that direct, explicit taxes are preferred to this 
form of indirect and implicit taxation. Implicit taxation is more challenging to comprehend 
and ignores specific characteristics tied to the individual firm or consumer (Stiglitz, 2009; 
Pauly, 1994). Furthermore, some firms may incur more costs to fulfil a mandate (or a 
proscription) than what is desired from the regulators point of view. 
In the previous section, the issues concerning market power, and in particular monopolies, 
were elaborated. Governments can intervene in a number of ways to prevent monopolies from 
exploiting their market power. On the one hand, the government can choose to regulate the 
monopolist’s price or profit. This relates to the previous discussion regarding regulation. In 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that VW arguably both cheated information requirements and mandates to increase overall fuel 
efficiencies in their car fleet. 
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this case, it is used to ensure that monopoly power is kept to a minimum, in terms of restricting 
the power the monopolist has to determine prices. On the other hand, government can choose 
to nationalise the monopoly or subject the market to franchising (Duff, 1997). The latter will 
be elaborated in more detail in section 2.2. At this point, it suffices to establish that franchising 
in this context refers to granting a firm the right to supply a market with a good or a service. 
The purpose is to create competition for the market, rather than within the market (Demsetz, 
1968). Nationalisation refers to the state taking ownership of the assets, following an “arm’s 
length” approach as a guiding principle of control (Duff, 1997).  
Governments use nationalisation to meet economic, social and political objectives. For 
example, a government may nationalise health services to protect public interest and provide 
a universal service that should be irrespective of income. In the years following Second World 
War, a whole series of industries and public utilities were transferred to public ownership in 
the UK – coal and civil aviation in 1946, the railways in 1947, gas in 1948 and in 1949, the 
steel industry was transferred to public ownership. In 1979, the elected Conservative 
government, fronted by Margaret Thatcher, reversed the earlier nationalisation (Baijal, 2000). 
The UK exemplified a trend of nationalisation and later privatisation that occurred in several 
of countries. Since the Thatcher government embarked on privatisation in the 1980s, 
privatisation programs have significantly reduced the role of state-owned companies in many 
European countries (Megginson & Netter, 2001). This change in the status-quo was caused by 
a growing concern that nationalisation failed to achieve economic efficiency.  
2.1.3 Regulation failure; the need for free markets? 
Regulations are viewed by the traditional welfare economics as means to alleviate market 
failure; nevertheless, some economic models claim that government regulation has its own 
failures. There are three main views on regulatory failures: the first argue that regulations are 
captured by regulated bodies, the second is similar, and points to regulations being in the 
interest of regulators, whereas the third focus on the cost of regulation. The two first argues 
that the beneficiaries of regulation are the regulators or the regulated bodies, not the taxpayers 
and users. The third focuses on the cost of regulation (Stigler, 1971; Majone, 1994; James, 
2000)  
The regulatory “capture” theory claim that the interests of the regulated bodies are what causes 
the regulation to develop and grow (Stigler, 1971). Advocates for the regulatory “capture” 
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theory claim that firms will lobby for regulation to effectively shut potential entrants out of 
the market. This would enable firms to increase the prices, protected from the threat of new 
entry. Another key concern arises from incumbent firms that supply government services on 
management contracts. These firms do not own residual revenues; thus, their focus is shifted 
from profit-maximization to increasing their share of the national budget. The result is a larger 
than necessary budget through for example maximizing output produced in order to get a 
higher budget allowance. This could also be the result of bureaucrats maximising slack, where 
the budgets are pushed up and output falls to maximise the resources available to pursue 
individual goals (James, 2000). In either case, regulations create economic inefficiencies.  
The second theory introduces a rather more complex principal-agent model. The focus is 
mainly on ambitious officials seeking to introduce new policies to make a name for themselves 
(Majone, 1994).  
The third theory views regulatory failure from a cost-based perspective. This view argues that 
the resources that should be used to pursue public interest goal, are rather spent on running the 
regulatory system (James, 2000).  
Neoliberalism has a different focus on regulatory failure altogether. It emphasises the 
importance of individual liberty, a minimal role for the state in society and the “free” market. 
The role of the state is central to maintaining and defending a free society, through law 
enforcement. Beyond that, neoliberalism questions the state, because neoliberalists also view 
it as the greatest potential threat to the freedom it protects. They favour the free market as the 
mean to organise economic and social affairs; and hence favour privatisation as opposed to 
nationalisation (Shaw, 2000).  
Vickers and Yarrow (1991) claimed that privatisation of former state-owned enterprises and 
services can be divided into three different categories of privatisation. The first is privatisation 
of competitive firms; the second is the privatisation of monopolies and the third is to contract 
out publicly financed services. All three have the potential to generate government revenues, 
if they are successfully sold to the private sector.  
A key distinction between the two first categories is that the authorities typically retain some 
rights of control, through regulation, in the second case concerning the privatisation of 
monopolies. The authorities choose to do so, to prevent the company exploiting its market 
power, i.e. to continue to correct for the market failure created by having a monopoly operator. 
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The difference between public and private enterprises is arguably more a matter of degree in 
industries where government interventions remain extensive.  
The latter type of privatisation is the core focus of this thesis, and concerns franchising 
agreements between the authority and operating parties4. This refers to firms having been 
granted rights to supply markets with goods or services that may or may not generate revenue. 
As competition may be undesirable in such instances due to for example scale economies, the 
authority can advance efficiency through competition for the market. In the following section, 
this will be elaborated and debated in further detail. 
2.2 Competition for the Market  
The thesis has so far explored the advantages, and pitfalls, of competition in the market. 
Although perfect competition can be beneficial, there are many cases in which the conditions 
to achieve economic efficiency are not satisfied. In particular, the thesis has explored the 
conditions in which market power is present. Competition for the market is one solution when 
competition in the market is not feasible or likely to prosper.  
2.2.1 Competition for the market as a response to market failure 
As already stated, a natural monopoly will be a case where competition in the market is not 
economically desirable; however leaving it by itself could result in firms exploiting its 
monopoly power. Authorities may solve this through introducing concessions, with the aim of 
providing competition for the market through competitive bidding for contracts. The aim is 
that the competitive bidding will offer many of the same benefits as in perfect competition 
(OECD, 2007). In addition, this could prove a valuable source for government revenues.  
The alternative to introducing concessions is to privatise the previously owned state 
monopoly. The private sector promotes efficiency, as they are predominantly concerned with 
nurturing profits. As such, even a privately owned enterprise would be expected to advance 
efficiencies more than the same enterprise would achieve under state-ownership. Private firms 
                                                 
4 This concerns both private and public operators. 
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are able to more proficiently respond to customer demand, have stronger incentives to increase 
quality and to deliver on costumer’s wants (Beesle & Littlechild, 1992; OECD, 2007).  
Nevertheless, reaping the benefits of competition can be difficult when privatising previously 
state-owned monopolies. The state-owned monopolies have usually been in place to correct 
market failures. Hence, privatising can come at the expense of customer welfare. If the private 
firms face little competition due to for instant high entry barriers, then cost-reducing measure 
can come at the expense of quality, as customer have little choice. By introducing concessions 
one hopes to be able to control the downsides of privatisation, whilst obtaining the benefits of 
competition and the efficiency gains that comes with it. 
Demsetz (1968) advocated formal auctions as practical mechanisms to control monopoly 
power. He reasoned that:  
If one bidder can do the job at less than two or more, because each would then have a 
smaller output rate, then the bidder with the lowest bid for the entire job will be 
awarded the contract, whether the good be cement, electricity, stamp vending machines 
or whatever, but the lowest bid price need not be a monopoly price. (p. 57)  
There are two compelling economic arguments to why competition for the market should be 
able to achieve lower payments (or higher profit) for any given service level. Firstly, firms 
will be incentives to enter lower subsidy bids when competing to win the contract. In the case 
of competition for profitable contracts, firms will be incentivised to submit higher bids. 
Secondly, the bidding process helps the authority select the most efficient supplier (Lalivea & 
Schmutzler, 2008).  
2.2.2 Why competitive tenderings fail; the continued need for 
regulation 
These bidding markets have been criticised for violating several assumptions that need to be 
present in order to defend the creation or maintenance of highly concentrated markets. By 
failing to satisfy the assumptions, the justification collapses and these markets bear similar 
traits to those created by market power in “regular” markets (Klemperer, 2007).  
When describing the characteristics of an ideal or “true” bidding market, it can be useful to 
explore the European Commission’s definition of a bidding market. They describe it as a 
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market where “tenders take place infrequently, while the value of each individual contract is 
usually very significant. Contracts are typically awarded to a single successful bidder (so-
called “winner-takes-it-all” principle)” (European Commission, 2000).  
Klemperer (2007) investigated the definition of the European Commission and explored the 
separate assumptions either implicitly or explicitly stated in the abovementioned definition. 
First, the final part of the European Commission definition explains how there are no even 
trade-offs between price offered and quantity sold. Put differently, either the firm offers a price 
at which it gets all the market, or the firm offers a price at which it loses, and thus gets none 
of the market. Furthermore, as there is only one winner, and since each contract is “very 
significant” each bidding process is characterised an element of “bet your company”. Although 
not explicitly stated in the definition5, one implicit assumption is that competition begins 
afresh, with no lock-ins, so that previous contests do not determine the outcome of a new 
bidding process. Almost as an implicit assumption of the previous one, entry barriers are low, 
so that new suppliers can enter the market without difficulty.  
With these assumptions satisfied, competition for the market would solve the issues that could 
arise with concentrated markets. It would be sufficient to have two firms competing in the 
bidding process, as it would fit a Bertrand price-setting competition, where consumers accept 
the lowest price offered. Assuming constant marginal costs and no capacity constraints, this 
would yield an equivalent equilibrium to perfect competition. Previously earned market shares 
would not entail future victory nor market power (Klemperer, 2007). 
Using reason, Klemperer (2007) proves that bidding markets, in general, do not differ much 
from ‘regular’ markets, and that hence, anti-trust problems can arise just as easily in these 
markets. He argues that auctions are rarely a one-unit auction where one winner “takes it all”. 
Even in the rail industry, where this is arguably the case, the bidder can seldom predict the 
required level to win the bid, either because the firm is unaware of the competing firms’ costs, 
or because the product or service offered is differentiated. Regardless, the result is that the 
firm will face a trade-off between price and expected quantity sold (Klemperer, 2007).  
                                                 
5 However stated elsewhere by the European Commission, that “in bidding markets, market shares may not be informative” 
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There are many cases where competition does not start afresh with each contracting period. 
Furthermore, there may be significant lock-ins associated with entry. Winning for instant in 
one jurisdiction can potentially provide advantages in similar contests. There are also several 
of cases, particular in certain industries such as consulting, architectural and construction, 
where the process of bidding for contracts involve less significant, “bet your company” type 
of competition (Klemperer, 2007). 
The definition also struggles with a coherent internal logic. If the bidding process only results 
in one winner and each contract is a significant part of the business, then it follows that the 
winner will gain substantial experience and achieves economies of scale. This contradicts the 
assumption that there is no lock-ins so that competition starts anew. Additionally, if the 
bidding market fails the condition that competition beings afresh, with no sunk costs, then 
presumably it also fails the assumption that entry is easy (Klemperer, 2007).  
Indeed, Williamson (1976) argues that the current holder of the franchise contract enjoy a 
substantial incumbency advantages over non-winners. Therefore, he claims that no real 
competition can take place at contract renewal. The advantages exist in form of on-the-job 
experience, i.e. information, which is not available to other potential bidders. Partly, it is also 
attributed to the challenges to determine unambiguous rules for valuing assets that may be 
transferred. 
When the assumptions do not hold, concentrated markets are harmful irrespective of whether 
they are “regular” markets or bidding markets. The challenges concerning market failure, and 
in particular market power, may not necessarily be less sever in bidding markets (Klemperer, 
2007). However, in the case of public tendering, some of the profit is captured by the public. 
2.2.3 Contestable markets as opposed to perfect markets 
Interestingly, Demsetz’ (1968) arguments for auctions to control natural monopolies are part 
of what the literature now calls “contestable markets” theory. The “contestable markets” 
theory claims that Demsetz conditions for controlling natural monopolies are not contingent 
on auction mechanisms, but rather depend on the threat of entry. The theory is developed by 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) and the basic concept is that the mere threat of entry 
disciplines the monopolist’s behaviour almost as effectively as if there had been competition 
in the market. 
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A fundamental assumption is that entry is entirely free, and exit is costless. Freedom of entry, 
however, neither implies that it is costless nor easy; the essence is that the entrants suffer no 
disadvantages compared to the incumbent regarding production techniques or perceived 
product quality. Finally, the entrants must be able to evaluate the profitability of entry based 
on the incumbent’s pre-entry prices. Baumol et al. (1982) argue that absolute freedom of exit 
is one condition that guarantees freedom of entry. Risk of entry is eliminated if all capital is 
saleable or reusable without loss over and above normal user cost and depreciation.  
Contestable markets hence share an important attribute with perfect competition: Free entry 
and exit. The vital feature that ensures market contestability is its vulnerability to hit-and-run 
entry. A potential entrant can make use of even brief profit opportunities, by moving into the 
market and before the environment change, collect the gains and depart (Baumol et al., 1982).  
There are three identified welfare properties of contestable markets. Firstly, a contestable 
market cannot offer abnormal profit (in the long-run). If there is any economic profit, i.e. 
abnormal profit, it represents an earnings opportunity for entrants, as they are able to hit and, 
if required, run. Thus even in a monopoly equilibrium, there will be zero economic profit in a 
contestable market. The same argument constitutes the fundament of the second welfare 
characteristic: A contestable market achieves efficiency in production. Similar to abnormal 
profit, inefficiencies equals an incitement for entrants to move in and exploit these. Thirdly, 
no product is sold at a price less than its marginal cost in the long-run equilibrium. The final 
characteristic implies that in perfectly contestable markets, cross-subsidy is impossible. In 
other words, predatory pricing cannot be used as a weapon of unfair competition (Baumol et 
al., 1982).   
Contestable market theory offers an (near to) ideal benchmark of wider applicability than 
perfect competition. Still, it offers efficiency in production and a market where firms with 
market power have no way of using that to obtain abnormal profit. Regrettably, it is 
questionable whether even this broader benchmark applies to any real markets.  
2.3 Auction Design   
Competitive tendering of franchises to supply a market with goods or services involves some 
form of an auction. It is essential to understand that there is no such thing as one right auction 
design, and that certain trade-offs need to be made. Hence, the government needs to take the 
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perspective of what is the ideal outcome, and with this given, what is essential for them and 
what can be traded-off to achieve this. A successful auction design requires tailoring to the 
specific details of the context, as well as reflecting the wider economic picture (Klemperer, 
2002).   
Just as competition is an appropriate mechanism to ensure economic efficiency, auctions too 
are used to ensure efficiency: in equilibrium, the winning firm will be the bidder with the 
highest value of the object. This follows as the winning bid will normally be the highest bid, 
at least in a price auction, which should be placed, logically, by the firm that has the highest 
valuation (Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal, & Turner, 2005). Therefore, auctions can be a good 
way to raise revenues. However, auctions do only produce efficient outcomes given certain 
assumptions, as with perfect competition.  
There are critical decisions that will or may influence the outcome of auctions, which will be 
elaborated in the following sections. Furthermore, it is not granted that the objective of an 
auction will be to increase revenues; sometimes it will be other objectives, and the various 
decisions need to be founded on the specific objectives. 
2.3.1 Price auctions vs. Beauty Contests 
One critical distinction is between auctions on the one hand and Beauty Contests, also known 
as comparative tenders, on the other. Auctions are allocation mechanisms in which a pre-
defined algorithm can establish which firm will offer the best bid. In a Beauty Contest, the 
auctioneer sets a number of criteria that will be used to evaluate the different bids (Binmore 
& Klemperer, 2002).  
A Beauty Contest can be either weighted or unweighted.  An unweighted contest would imply 
that the firms are unaware of how the bids were to be evaluated. In a weighted contest, 
however, the participating firms know in advance what criteria they are to be assessed on, and 
what the various weights would be on the different criteria. Nevertheless, a Beauty Contests 
would always involve some ambiguousness. Even though maximum scores on criteria are 
known, it is hard to assess how to score bidders (objectively) on a given criterion (Janssen, 
2004). 
Inherently, Beauty Contests are used because auctioneers want to allow some autonomy in 
assessing the bids; otherwise, a price auction would be more accurate. Put differently, Beauty 
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Contests embrace, to some extent, the flexibility that follows subjectivity. Therefore, the key 
difference between auctions and Beauty Contests is that the latter always encompasses an 
element that cannot definitely be quantified (Dykstra & Windt, 2004).  
In literature, auctions usually come out as the preferred allocation mechanism to Beauty 
Contests. Binmore and Klemperer (2002) compared auctions with Beauty Contests, and found 
that auctions outperformed Beauty Contests on a number of aspects. Auctions, when properly 
designed, were more likely to allocate resources to the firm that could use the object most 
valuably. They argued that a price auction would urge managers to put their “money where 
their mouths are” (p. 76) when placing the bids. This would be more reliable than if 
auctioneers, e.g. government bureaucrats, would be responsible for assessing the merits of the 
bids.  
Designing a Beauty Contest would also be more time-consuming and less transparent than an 
auction. Transparency requires objective evaluating criteria, which by definition is impossible 
in Beauty Contests. The issue is that it is difficult to quantify, accurately, qualitative aspects 
and give appropriate weighting to these. A lack of objective assessment criteria and weighting 
makes it unviable to construct objective comparisons of various bids. That particular 
shortcoming can lead to (perceived) favouritism and corruption. Binmore and Klemperer 
(2002) indicate that whereas the Spanish and Swedish 3G spectrum Beauty Contests resulted 
in lawsuits and substantial and lasting political debate, losing bidders in the UK complimented 
the government on its auction process. The transparency issue is made more complex by the 
fact that perceived favouritism and corruption are enough to discourage possible entrants, even 
if the process is in reality fair.  
Cartelier (2003) argue that the challenge of Beauty Contests has less to do with the evaluation 
and comparison of the bids itself as the fact that the assessment process opens for information 
manipulation. Because Beauty Contests lack a fully objective algorithm to assess the bids, the 
complexity of the assessment process can be exploited to benefit the bidding firm. Although 
it is questionable whether it is right to claim that the evaluation and comparison offers little 
trouble in a Beauty Contest, the argument still addresses a critical issue. That is, Beauty 
Contests are vulnerable to manipulation by the firm, with or without corruption and 
favouritism on the auctioneer side. 
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Furthermore, as long as the objective is to raise government income, Beauty Contests will fall 
short of auctions in stimulating price competition and ensuring that the highest bidder wins 
(Binmore & Klemperer, 2002).  
That is not to say that prices cannot still be one criterion in a Beauty Contest. One advantages 
of including price, as one criteria in Beauty Contests, is the information it reveals: it would be 
an indication of how much money the auctioneer would be willing to give up, in the event that 
the object is not awarded to the bidder with the highest price offer (Janssen, 2004).  
To ensure efficiency, a price auction needs to be designed in a way that all potential parties 
are offered equal information and a fair playing field. In other words, the differences in the 
bids should only be caused by differences in the valuation of the objects – nothing else. In a 
pure common value auction, this would imply that if designed correctly, all parties bid the 
same, correct, value for the object. This is nevertheless difficult to achieve. A key challenge 
is that there will be a difference in information between the incumbent and new entrants. This 
creates arguably unfair advantages to the incumbent (Janssen, 2004). To battle this, 
information needs to be made available to potential bidders. However, it is questionable how 
cooperative the incumbent would be to supply the regulators with crucial information when it 
is in the incumbent’s best interest to keep competitors uninformed. 
If the auctioneer wishes to encourage qualitative aspects that are not easily identified and 
quantified to fit a pre-determined algorithm, then a price auction risk falling short of a Beauty 
Contest. An auction does not credit any initiatives that are not quantified and included in the 
algorithm, unless the initiatives also affect aspects that are part of the algorithm, e.g. the overall 
price offering or subsidy requirement (Janssen, 2004).  
Auctions also introduce the risk of the winner’s curse, which is discussed in more detail in the 
following section. The winner’s curse explains why winning bids may be based upon 
judgmental failures and overly optimistic forecasts about revenues and costs (Alexandersson 
& Hultén, 2006A). 
Whether a Beauty Contest or an auction is chosen, consumer interest is in neither of the cases 
directly represented. In either case, the process can be designed to include consumer interests. 
The auctioneer can decide to design the process so that firms bid in terms of the price they set 
in the market. This can be included when the concession concerns operations in well-
established markets, where services and technology progress rather slowly (Janssen, 2004). 
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2.3.2 Ascending, descending or sealed-bid auction 
Other distinct choices to be made are whether that auction should be ascending or descending 
and whether the price paid by the winner should be based on the price bid, or the second best 
price offer. Ascending auctions are the “standard” auctions, where the bidding price starts low 
and competing bidders raise the price. The winner will be the remaining firm when no other 
firm wishes to bid, and the price paid by the firm is the final price offered. A Dutch auction is 
similar, with the key difference being that instead of starting low, prices decrease until a bidder 
claims the object. In sealed-bid auctions, the firms submit bids that are sealed, i.e. unknown 
to the other participants. In first-price sealed-bid auctions, the bidder that places the highest 
bid obtains the object at the price he bid. Second-price sealed-bid auctions are similar, and 
differ only by the fact that the winning firm obtains the object at the price equal to the second 
highest bid (Milgrom & Weber, 1982).  
A descending (Dutch) auction and first-price, sealed-bid auctions are strategically equivalent, 
which imply that the equilibria must be equal for the two auction formats. The descending 
auction requires that the auctioneer commence by naming a very high price, and lower it until 
a party claims the object. Therefore, the bidder indicates at which level he will claim the object; 
and the winner will be the one who has the highest valuation. The winner will pay the price 
equal to that amount. This coincides with the way the winner and price is determined in a 
sealed-bid, first-price auction. The ascending and the second-price, sealed-bid auction are also 
strategically equivalent, i.e. have corresponding outcome equilibria. In both the auctions, there 
is a unique dominant-strategy equilibrium: The winner will be the one with the highest 
valuation, though the price paid will be the value of the object to the bidder with the second 
highest value. An ascending auction terminates when no firm is willing to challenge the 
winner’s final bid, even if the winner has a higher valuation than the current offer. In a sealed-
bid second-price auction, the winner submits a bid equal the valuation of the object, but pays 
the second highest price (Milgrom & Weber, 1982).  
The outcomes of the four auction forms are Pareto optimal; the winner is the bidder who has 
the highest valuation of the object, which follows from the aforementioned arguments on the 
equilibrium solutions. Moreover, the four auction forms should lead to identical expected 
revenues. Hence, the auctioneer should be indifferent between the four different auctioning 
formats, in theory (Milgrom & Weber, 1982). 
 32
However, there are critical pitfalls associate with all formats, which will be explored in the 
following sections. The discussion will centre on the risk of collusion, the winner’s curse and 
entry deterrence and predation. 
Participants in an auction either could explicitly or tacitly collude to avoid high prices. This 
would reduce the potential income, or increase the subsidy paid, for the government. Theory 
suggests that collusion can in particular represent a challenge in ascending auctions and 
second-price, sealed-bid auctions. In ascending auctions, the bidder can use the early stages to 
signal who should win which contract. They could then tacitly agree to stop bidding, as 
continued bidding would only have increased the price or reduced the subsidy. Additionally, 
ascending auctions give room for retaliation and a mechanism to punish deviators, both 
implicitly (as threats) and explicitly (Klemperer, 2007).   
Robinson (1985) argued that second-price sealed-auctions were more likely to facilitate 
collusive behaviour; however, this was under the assumption that the designated winner was 
the buyer with the highest valuation. In this scenario, the firm with the highest valuation places 
a bid equal to his own valuation. Since the other participants know that the only way they can 
win the auction is by placing a higher bid, which would have exceeded their own valuation, 
they have no incentive to overbid the designated winner. The winner can hence ask the other 
members to bid a price close to the seller’s reservation price or refrain from participating in 
the process altogether. The winner can be confident in such cases that the competing firms 
have few incentives to do otherwise.  
The difference, which increases the likelihood of collusion in second-price sealed-bid auctions 
as opposed to first-price sealed-bid auctions, can be explained by the variation in control over 
relevant parameters. In a first-price auction, the members of a cartel can only control the price 
offered by the designated winner. If the price bid by the designated winner falls below the 
valuation of any other member, there is a profitable incentive for that or those members to 
deviate. In a second-price auction, the cartel has two relevant parameters: the price offered by 
the designated winner, and the highest price bid by the other members. As the designated 
winner, the firm with the highest valuation commits itself to place a bid equal to its valuation; 
and hence it deprives the other members of any incentive to deviate. The other firms will then 
place bids at a pre-agreed price. If however, the designated winner should be one that has a 
lower valuation than other members of the cartel have, there will be an incentive again for 
those to profitable deviate (Ungern-Sternberg, 1998).  
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Another major challenge in auctions is the adverse selection bias that arises, also known as the 
winner’s curse. Most auctions entail some element of common value, which is unknown to the 
participants. The bidding process will be characterised by participants trying to obtain an 
unbiased estimate of the value of the object. If there is little to no private value, the 
participating firms will attempt to estimate the unknown common value. In such cases, the 
winning bid will be the one that had the most optimistic estimate. This entails that on average 
the winning bid is estimated higher than the object’s actual value (Wolfstetter, 1996). Bids 
will typically fall within a distribution, with bids exceeding and falling short of the actual 
value, though with a large number of observations where the true value would not be far from 
the average. However, the average bid does not win; it is the highest bid, by definition. Hence, 
the winner’s curse refers purely to the statistical bias that arises from such a selection process. 
Consequentially, the winner may experience below normal, or possibly even negative, profit 
(Kagel, Levin, Battalio, & Meyer, 1989).  
Literature favour open auction formats when the objective is to lower the possibility of 
winner’s curse. In these auctions, bidders have the possibility to learn from the competing 
firms, and revise their own valuations as they observe the other firms bidding strategy. Indeed, 
in the ascending auctions, bidders can take note of the prices at which competitors drop out. 
As more information is revealed in open auction formats relative to sealed-bid auctions, it may 
reduce the chances of the winner’s curse (Klemperer, 2007).  
If certain adjustments are made, firms can avoid the winner’s curse. One strategy for the firm 
is to deflate the expected value of the object before the auction. When buyers act according to 
this manner, a winner’s curse can be prevented in the sense that bidders do no longer, on 
average pay more than the value of the object (Kagel et al., 1989). This can also present a 
challenge, if the aim of the auction is to increase government income. As uncertainty and the 
risk of the winner’s curse are reduced, bidders can safely bid more aggressively, hence 
increasing the government’s income (Cramton, 1998).  
The winner’s curse is more likely to be a challenge in a new market, as limited data makes the 
operator more prone to make faulty assumptions. Similarly, inexperienced bidders are more 
vulnerable to suffering the winner’s curse. Learning will eventually increase the bidders’ 
ability to make rightful assumptions about both private and common value. Hence, learning 
reduces the chances of the winner’s curse (Adnett, 1998).  
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Another element, which affects the likelihood of the winner’s curse, is the number of 
competitors. The winner’s curse is an adverse selection bias, which implies that as the number 
of bids increases, the probability that the auctioneer will receive bids that are above the object 
value, increases. Nonetheless, Hong and Shum (2002) argue that firms often contemplate this, 
knowing that their chances of winning the bid is lower with more bidders, which results in 
more cautious bidding. They claim that winner’s curse effect of increasing the number of 
bidders actually implies that firms bid less aggressively. Alexandersson and Hultén (2007) 
similarly found that there was a reduced deviation of bids when there were more than three 
bidders. On the other hand, theory would suggest that rational firms that are aware of the 
winner’s curse should contemplate this regardless of the number of bidders and factor in a risk 
premium in the bids. Still, this thesis finds that the winner’s curse seem to be an empirical 
reality in the rail sector, suggesting that in general firms do not factor in an appropriate risk 
premium.  
Hong and Shum (2002) argue that there is another reason why bids tend to become more 
bullish with increased competition. They claim that bids become more bullish due to “the 
competition effect”, not the winner’s curse. The competition effect refers to the increased 
bullishness of the bids when the number of competition firms increases. 
Public information does help to correct overly optimistic estimated of an objects worth: When 
the winner’s curse is present, public information reduces revenue, as participants correct their 
bids. As such, public information reduces the change of the winner’s curse. Intriguingly, public 
information tends to increase revenue when a winner’s curse is absent. The participants may 
have lowered their bids to avoid the winner’s curse, i.e. they factor in risk premiums. As public 
information reduces the risk, the risk premium needed is lowered, and the bids increase in 
value (Kagel & Levin, 2002).  
Finally, the third area of concern of auction design is how it influences the ability for 
auctioneers to attract bidders. Just as with competition in the market, few participants in the 
bidding process can potentially be inefficient. 
Ascending auctions often deter entry. The firm that has the highest value of the object will 
eventually be the winner, as it can top any opposition, even if it is outbid at an early stage. 
Other firms have little incentive to participate in the bidding, particularly if there is any cost 
associated with participating in the auction (Klemperer, 2002).  
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Sealed-bid auctions can hence be more desirable if one is aiming to promote competition to 
challenge incumbents and level the playing field. The merit of sealed-bid auctions is that the 
outcome is much less certain. Still, dominant firms are likely to win the auction. This is 
normally the objective with an auction: to allow the “stronger” bidder to win, because the 
“stronger” winner often is the right winner. Nevertheless, if there are reasons to believe that 
levelling the field will provide future benefits, then it may be beneficial to allow weaker 
bidders to win some objects/contracts. 
The reason why dominant firms are less likely to win the auction in a sealed-bid auction, is 
because the “stronger” firms desires to extract some profit and get the object at less than its 
reservation price. Therefore, the “stronger” bidder may offer a bid below what the firm would 
be pushed to offer in an ascending auction. This opens the possibility of victory for the 
“weaker” bidders. (Klemperer, 2002).  
2.4 Contract Design   
2.4.1 Risk allocation in public-private partnerships 
The thesis has so far discussed competition in markets, competitive tendering and auction 
forms. When the private operator, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, enters 
into a franchising agreement, they commence a public-private partnership. Van Ham and 
Koppenjan (2001) identified public-private partnerships as “co-operation of some durability 
between public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and 
share risks, costs and resources which are connected with these products or services.” (p. 598) 
Contracting partners in agreements in general, and between the public and private in particular, 
are characterised by the parties having different stakeholders, and therefore different 
objectives, risk perceptions and constraints. Governments seek to maximize total social 
benefits, whereas private operators seek to maximize profit. Adapting this to the more realistic 
assumptions of bounded rationality, the public would seek to improve the quality of service 
and the private operators would seek a reasonable return on investment (Ng & Loosemore, 
2007). 
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Risk can be diversified by spreading it across many projects or many bearers. This allows for 
a high diversification of risk. On the one hand, the private sector can spread the operational 
and financial risks on numerous of projects and on the other, the government can spread the 
residual risk on many bearers. Generally, there are two principles that are used when allocating 
risks between the public and the private sector in any agreement. The first is that the risk 
should be allocated to the responsible party and the party that can control it, whereas the 
second suggest that a risk factor should be allocated based on which party is more able to bear 
the risk. Therefore, one can interpret it so that risks should initially be allocated based on who 
has the responsibility for it, and the residual risk, should be distributed based on who has the 
strongest ability to bear it (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 1997).  
Williamson (1976) questions the effectiveness of Demsetz’ argument that competition for the 
market will achieve an efficient outcome under uncertainty, asymmetric information and 
transaction costs. These risks can occur in any relationship involving competitive tendering; 
however, the incidence of these might be higher in PPP projects. This is because the 
government still has the asset ownership, there is a complex risk sharing between the state and 
the private sector and the private party’s involvement is usually longer and with a bigger stake 
involved than under traditional financing (Checherita, & Gifford, 2007).  
A particular issue regarding risk and contract design relates to incomplete contracts and 
opportunistic behaviour. Williamson (1985) argued that (market) relationships are challenging 
when they require relation-specific investment, and occurs in a complex environment. If one 
firm incurs investment, the other party might exploit the dependent nature of the relationship 
to renegotiate the contract. The government risks opportunism related to renegotiation if the 
project does turn out to be less successful than expected by the franchise, due to their 
commitment to offer a given level of train services. Though a commitment from the 
government to let a failed franchise go bankrupt would prevent such opportunisms, it is hardly 
credible that the government would be willing to do so and/or that they would be able to 
withstand the pressure from labour groups (Engel et al., 1997). 
Hart (2003) argues that the only source of incentives is asset ownership. He assumes that the 
operating party can perform two types of investment, one productive and one unproductive 
form. Both reduce the operating costs, though only the productive investment increases the 
social benefit additionally. If the operator cannot internalize the impact of his effort, neither 
through the increased value, nor on the reduced cost, the operator will implement a trivial 
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amount of either investment. Under a public private partnership Hart assumes that the builder 
internalize only the impact of the cost reduction and not the positive benefits. Hence, the 
operator will implement productive investment, but also too much of the unproductive. What 
can be drawn from these arguments is that the operator will incur more effort when he benefits 
directly. 
2.4.2 Contract duration 
Determining the contract length has its own implications, and hence it is an important 
parameter to consider. The following sections will discuss some aspects that affect contract 
design, which can be applied when determining the length of each contract.  
The advantage of longer contracts is that it holds the benefit of amortizing the fixed auction 
costs over a longer period, so that the transaction costs of each auction is minimised. Ideally, 
contracts should maintain incentives for efficient adaptation, whilst minimizing the need for 
costly settlement and enforcement (Crocker & Masten, 1988). However, as this is often 
difficult, an alternative solution could be to develop shorter-term contracts, which entails more 
flexibility. Therefore, transaction costs and uncertainty are key determinants when considering 
contract length (Gray, 1978).  
Furthermore, some argue that the length of a contract should be set so that the expected 
revenues collected are sufficient to recover the investment. If the sector is highly concentrated, 
there are arguments favouring both longer-term contracts and shorter-term contracts. On the 
one hand, concentrated markets favour a focus on reducing the frequency of interaction 
amongst competitors to reduce the chances of collusion or other anticompetitive agreements. 
On the other hand, introducing longer terms contracts increase market power and may increase 
the chances of collusion. Longer-term contracts protect the incumbent firm(s) from being 
replaced until the expiration of the contract and inhibit new entry. Therefore, the contracts 
need to be designed so that it encourages competitive behaviour from the incumbent(s) (Iossa, 
Spagnolo, & Vellez, 2007).  
If collusive agreements can be effectively prevented, or is of less concern, it could be advisable 
to use a shorter-term contract in a highly concentrated market. Shorter-term contracts would 
serve as to expose the incumbent(s) to competition and the market forces. This could also lead 
to experimentation and innovation, as a new innovative firm can be given the opportunity to 
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replace a less efficient incumbent. Contract renewal can potentially be used to incentivise and 
reward current operators to abide by the contracting terms and to undertake additional non-
contractible investments and quality-improving measures (Iossa et al., 2007). 
 
  
 39 
3. Theoretical Concerns in the Rail Industry 
The thesis has thus far discussed general theoretical considerations associated with market and 
regulatory failures, competition in and for the market and auction and content design. There 
is a vast amount of research on the topics specifically relating to the railway industry. Hence, 
the following sections will describe the theoretical concerns in the context of the railway 
industry. 
3.1 Market Failure and Regulatory Failure 
Up to the late 1980s, railways in Europe and worldwide have been organized as legal 
monopolies controlled by the state. Scale economics was for a long time presumed in the 
railway industry, justifying the monopoly provision of vertically integrated railway services 
(Shaw, 2000).  
A train service between two cities required an outlay of track, formation, rolling stock, motive 
power and administration. As more services are run, the costs are spread over more units of 
output. The average costs fall until a point where the inputs are used so intensively that the 
track becomes congested and the management is exhausted, at which point diseconomies sets 
in. Hence, a key barrier to competition in the railway industry is the large, necessary fixed 
costs of production. Starkie (1984) suggested that railways normally operate on the falling 
side of their cost curves. Hence, the railway industry is characterised as a natural monopoly 
since “a single, vertically-integrated firm can fulfil market demand more cheaply than two” 
(Starkie, 1984, p. 16). 
Nevertheless, Beesley and LittleChild (1992) argued that privatisation even without 
competition would procure benefits in the railway industry. They claimed that private firms 
are able to respond more easily to demand by better access to capital, and have a stronger 
incentive to increase quality and deliver on customer’s wants. Furthermore, they argued that 
there was in fact limited monopoly power due to close substitutes, such as road and air. A 
similar view prevailed amongst other academics, the railway industry and certain pressure 
groups, although Starkie (1984) suggest that for British Rail (BR), other transportation modes 
had little effect on BR’s performance (Shaw, 2000).  
 40
Starkie (1984) did not dismiss the claim that the railway’s true monopoly power has been 
reduced due to aviation and road transport. He merely claimed that it could not have effectively 
eliminated all market power, as the competition did not drive British Rail to full efficiency. 
The statement was built on the work of Stewart Joy (later BR’s chief economist) and the Report 
of the Serpell Committee that both implied that British rail was run inefficiently (Starkie, 
1984). 
Although the infrastructure aspect of railway industries is a natural monopoly, it can be argued 
that train services operations are not (Starkie, 1984; Shaw, 2000; På rett spor: Reform av 
jernbanesektoren, 2015). While assessing whether the privatisation of the Norwegian Railway 
should or should not have involved a vertical separation is beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
is important to understand the underlying argument for which this has been done. Starkie 
(1984) suggested that by distinguishing the ownership of the infrastructure from the ownership 
of train operators, there was an opportunity for having on-track competition. The infrastructure 
system have often remained a state-owned, or otherwise regulated monopoly, with economic 
responsibility separated from the rail services operators, which then can be exposed to 
competition (Jensen, 1998). There are some identified issues with allowing on-track 
competition. The nature of the railway industry leads to suggest externalities and network 
benefits in the market. One externality arises because of the impact a delay to one service have 
on the running of other operators. Another identified externality occurs as trains are delayed 
due to infrastructure failure. Both the externalities arise because the market is characterised by 
interdependency of rail services. The network benefits enjoyed by the customers arise from 
having one unified network. Tickets can be ‘inter-available’ so that passengers can use it on 
any train between origin and destination, and tickets can be purchased from any station on the 
network (Shaw, 2000).  
Another issue with on-track free market competition is that many railway lines are not 
commercially viable. Hence, a private provision would lead to an under-provision, unless 
subsidies are granted to the private operators. In Britain, the Serpell committee concluded in 
their report in 1983 that a major proportion of BR route miles would have to be closed for it 
to operate profitable (Shaw, 2000).  
Finally, several of scale advantages in railway operations can still make it sub-optimal to 
introduce competition. The key categories are the economies of scale and economies of 
density. Return to scale concerns falling average costs as an operator both expands its network 
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and increases the number of trains, whereas return to density concerns the benefits from 
running more trains on the existing network. Economies of scope, on the other hand, would 
refer to the fall in average costs from operating both freight and passenger services 
(Alexandersson, 2010).  
According to Preston (1996), there are significant economies of scale in network operations; 
furthermore, there is almost certainly an optimal size, and above that, there is diseconomies. 
Small European operators are characterised by increasing returns to scale, medium sized 
operators appear to experience constant return, and large operators seem affected by 
decreasing returns to scale. Nonetheless, nearly all railway operators experience increasing 
return to density. Furthermore, although there is some inconsistency in the findings, European 
and Japanese studies on railway suggest diseconomies of scope. Hence, passenger and freight 
services may possibly benefit from being operated by separate companies (Alexandersson, 
2010; Preston, 1996). 
Jensen (1998) argued that railway services have cost structures that are characterized partly 
by common costs for the whole business and for its subsets’, partly by fixed traceable costs 
for various activities. On-rail competition would hence lead to duplicated activities at different 
levels in the system. Furthermore, Jensen advocated that there were significant economies of 
scale in the railway industry through network effects. An operator would be able to co-utilise 
imperfectly divisible resources between different lines, and different train products on the 
same line. New entrants operating on only one line with one train-operation would be unable 
to create positive network effects. Similarly, it would lead to slightly negative network effects 
for the existing operators. 
3.2 Competition for vs. in the Market 
European transportation reforms have usually involved the introduction of competitive 
tendering as a mean for public procurement of bus and railway services. Competitive tendering 
of railway services correspond to competition for the market also referred to as competition 
for the track. The bidders compete for the right to operate a certain line, and once procured, a 
firm is granted the right to operate temporary the specified services as a monopoly provider 
(Alexandersson, 2010).  
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In difference from ordinary markets, the procuring entity has a strong position as a buyer, 
similar to that of a monopolist. The end consumers on the other hand, must use the supplier 
selected by the procuring entity. The train operator will enjoy a monopoly-like situation, 
though with restrictions, usually in terms of the inability to influence ticket price and supply 
(Alexandersson, 2010).  
Furthermore, as the operators are only competing for the market, rather than in the market, 
there is only competition at discreet points in time, with many years in between. The nature of 
the competitive tendering process therefore influences the possibilities for survival and growth 
of the bidding firms, and the competitive landscape, over time. Winning the right to operate a 
line is the only way to gain access to that line. Hence, a firm that loses a contract cannot use 
their acquired assets to operate a railway anymore. The firm is left with the choice of handing 
them over to the winning firm, or abandon them, permanently or to the next tendering process 
(which they might not win regardless). Consequently, losing a tender could ultimately result 
in the dismantling of an operator (Alexandersson, 2010). 
The UK created and privatised three Rolling Stock leasing companies in order to tackle a 
substantial part of this issue. The leasing companies are in charge of rolling equipment. The 
train operators must sign contracts with the leasing companies to lease traction and rolling 
stock (Yvrande-Billon & Ménard, 2005). In Sweden, regional authorities jointly own a rolling 
stock leasing company, whist the state owns the rolling stock for franchised long distance 
services (Nash, 2008). 
Relative to other competitive markets, the public procurement market seems to give incumbent 
firms substantial advantages in later public tenders. A firm that wins a contract in a tender 
becomes the only supplier for those lines for a substantial amount of time, which can usually 
be prolonged. Furthermore, once the contract is signed, there are often some possibilities for 
the winning supplier to renegotiate the contract. Hence, added on the fact that firms losing the 
contract might have been forced to exit the market altogether, incumbents hold an exceptional 
advantage (Alexandersson, 2010).  
The equivalent to competition in the market, and the alternative to franchising the railway 
tracks, is known as the open access approach. This model allows several operators to apply 
for the right to use the same tracks, as far as there is capacity. This option is mainly used for 
the more deregulated freight services in Europe (Alexandersson, 2010).  
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As the vast majority of passenger km in Europe is delivered with some type of public service 
obligation, there is little to suggest that commercial rail passenger operations are anything but 
severely restricted. This may be the reason why there are only a few cases of open access 
operators in the passenger rail market. For instant, open access operators are only granted 
permission in Great Britain, if it generates a given amount of new traffic, rather than by 
diverting traffic from existing operators (Nash, 2008).  
In the UK, two main challenges have been identified when introducing on-track competition: 
“free-riding” and “cream-skimming”. The former concerns the fact that franchises pay fixed 
and variable track charges, whereas open access operators only pay the variable charges. 
Hence, the new entrants ‘free-ride’ on the current investment in the industry. The later concern 
the fact that open access operators challenge incumbents on profitable lines, which reduces 
their revenue streams. This would be reflected in the bidding price, which would result in less 
funding for the unprofitable but socially valued services (Competition & Markets Authority, 
2015). Although these have specifically been identified for the UK, they represent issues that 
are relevant for more countries to consider when introducing on-track competition. 
On-track competition result in transaction costs for exchange processes between customers 
and competing firms. Competing operators would need to differentiate horizontally to attract 
customers, which may lead to increased costs relative to a state-owned monopoly by 
developing and maintaining brand awareness, loyalty, customer alignment and various sales 
channels. Furthermore, transaction costs arise from the necessity for authorisation of 
operators, amplified supervision of safety and monitoring of competitive behaviour in order 
to prevent discrimination, solve disagreements and to look after customers’ interest (Jensen, 
1998). 
Although quite a number of countries today have started to use competitive tender of rail 
service, there are still a few countries with no tendering procedure, where allocation is based 
on direct negotiation with (usually) one operator (see for example Nash & Rivera-Trujillo, 
2004).  
Competition in the market is at best, a supplement to competition for the market, due to the 
various issues discussed above. 
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3.3 Auction Design 
In some passenger railway markets in Europe, firms commit to supplying services at a 
specified level of quality, either for a subsidy or against a payment, through competitive 
tendering. This is comparable to price auctions with a sealed-bid procedure. Nevertheless, as 
the price is not the only factor the bidders are evaluated against, but also some quality aspects, 
it bears some traits of a Beauty Contest (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2006B). Although price is 
the main decisive criteria, most regulators also recognised quality improvements, when they 
come at no or little additional costs (Shaw, 2000; Alexandersson & Hultén, 2006B).   
The basis used to calculate the bid is the conditions stipulated by the procuring authority in 
their invitation to tender. It defines the type and amount of traffic to be produced, several of 
characteristics and requirements related to the rolling stock, maintenance, performance and 
quality. Requirements are generally defined at the minimum standard necessary, although it 
varies depending on the tendering process in the country (Alexandersson, 2010). 
One can draw without much difficulty a parallel between planning a start-up from scratch and 
calculating a bid in a tender for operating train services (Alexandersson, 2010). When 
constructing the bids, the bidder must combine a set of inputs, based upon what type of traffic 
and how much is to be produced. It will prove nearly impossible to get the true prices of all 
the input factors in advance of production. The offered bid will include a defined price as well 
as a presentation of how the firm plans to perform the services. Finally, the firm will have to 
demonstrate that it has the capabilities and financial means to deliver the services (Shaw, 2000; 
Alexandersson, 2010).  
The successful bidder may be more or less motivated to offer a service level or quality over 
and above the minimum requirements. One decisive factor for the level of motivation is 
whether it is gross or net cost contracts that are being tendered (Alexandersson, 2010). A gross 
cost contract would imply that the operator tender based on the costs required to operate the 
specified service and the contracting authorities retain the revenues. If the operator, though 
still basing the tender on the costs required to operate the service, is allowed to keep all the 
revenue from operating the specified service, it is a net cost contract (The Irish Competition 
Authority, 2012). In the latter, the revenues become an important, additional source of income 
for the operators that need to be accounted for in the bid. Operators committing to higher 
quality level may aspire to gain a more favourable evaluation from the regulator. Under a net 
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contract, such investments may additionally be motivated by increased ticket revenues 
(Alexandersson, 2010). 
The tendering process could be viewed as a hybrid of a price auction and a Beauty Contest, as 
briefly mentioned earlier in this section. The process is also usually sealed and a one-unit 
auction, i.e. the bidders cannot observe or revise their bids based on competitors’ behaviour. 
Price is nevertheless the most important criteria, and as the auction is similar to a sealed-bid 
auction, winners are “blind” to other operators’ offers (Shaw, 2000; Alexandersson, 2010; 
Kain, 2009).  
Consequently, it increases the risk of the winner’s curse. Operators are keen to win, and 
therefore have an increased chance of making heroic assumptions about developments in 
revenues and costs compared to what they would have done in an open bid process. This 
enhances the risk that the winning operator will be unable to satisfy the conditions stipulated 
in the contract. (Kain, 2009).  
Assessing whether the bidders have indeed submitted a bid that will make it subject to the 
winner’s curse is challenging. In the auctioning of goods, a seller can quickly learn if the 
bidder has over-extended their credits. In the auctioning of passenger train services, on the 
other hand, the consequences of overoptimistic bidding may not be perceptible until well into 
the contracting period (Kain, 2009).  
The short-term consequences may be interruption in delivery and transportation issues 
experienced by end consumers, which may result in negative socio-economic and 
environmental effects. As the confidence for the supply of goods and services diminishes, 
firms that initially contributed to healthy competition may choose to leave the industry 
altogether. Hence, bids that lead to losses, or low profitability, may impair future price 
competition and innovation in the train industry (Alexandersson, 2010). 
In the context of tendering public assets, it may be critical to understand that the rates of overly 
optimistic bids are also related to the bidders’ attitude towards risk. Amongst others, this 
includes the bidders’ view on the government’s willingness to bail them out, or renegotiate 
the contract, should the predictions be exceedingly bullish. This is related to moral hazard, i.e. 
the bidders comprehend that the government is willing to bail them out, and knows that this 
puts them in a favourable position to renegotiate the contract (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2007). 
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3.4 Contract Design 
In regards to tendering of public rail services, there are particularly three relevant risks. That 
is revenue risk, cost risk and risk related to the ability of the franchisee to fulfil its obligations.  
The commercial revenue risk entails components that the operators can and cannot influence. 
Economic growth seems to correlate strongly with passenger growth, which is clearly outside 
the control of the operators (Nash, 2008). Furthermore, the qualities of substitutes, i.e. roads, 
air routes etc., are also outside the control of the operator. Even so, the operator can invest in 
marketing and improve the quality and frequency of the service, both of which may influence 
the number of passengers, and hence revenue.  
Similarly, costs have risk components that are inside and outside of the operators’ control. The 
development of fuel prices and the development of wages in the overall society are outside of 
the control of the operator. Furthermore, the accesses to infrastructure and track access charges 
are risks that the operators face that are mostly outside of the operators’ control. On the other 
hand, train operators can improve cost efficiencies through its organizational design, business 
model, innovation etc.  
Whereas the two previous risks seem to include factors that the operator both can and cannot 
influence, the risk related to the ability of the franchisee to fulfil its obligations seems mostly 
to be under the control of the operators. This risk relates to the inability to deliver outside of 
what can be related to revenue and cost risks. The operators can control this by bidding 
according to their ability to deliver. 
To address these issues, various contracts can be developed. One type is a net contract, were 
the operator accept both the commercial (on revenues) and the industrial (on cost) risks. The 
second type of regulatory schemes is gross contracts, where the industrial risk is born by the 
operator, whereas the government assumes the commercial risk. Finally, operators may be 
regulated by cost-plus contracts, where the operator assumes neither industrial risk nor 
commercial risk. These final contracts are commonly also referred to as management contracts 
(Beck, 2011; Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 2002) 
Determining contract length in the railway industry introduces some challenges. On the one 
hand, as increased competition is usually the primarily reason for privatising railways, one 
would want to promote this by having shorter-term contracts. For instant, the UK Treasury 
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officials argued initially that franchises should be no longer than three to five years (Shaw, 
2000).  
Nevertheless, short-term contracts raise several challenges. It takes considerable time to build 
new company identities and re-brand a railway. Moreover, the auctioning costs will have to 
be spread over fewer years if the contracts have a short duration. Hence, short-term contracts 
might negate any associated benefits with competition (Shaw, 2000). Attracting private 
investments might be difficult if the contracts are too short (Shaw, 2000; Janssen, 2004). This 
is in part due to the time-scale required for such investment in the rail industry, and partly due 
to the interdependence between infrastructure and rolling stocks. The latter suggest that if any 
rail track authority is to consider an investment in the industry to accommodate new 
investments made in for example electric trains on the operating company’s part, then it needs 
to know that these electric trains will run for a substantial period (Shaw, 2000).  
Finally, short-term contracts do not address the residual value risk that firms face. The assets 
invested in are generally long-lived and highly specific. Particularly, this will be a concern in 
the first round of franchising, as the firms do not know if there will be an attractive second 
hand market. As such, firms would aim to amortise the rolling stocks during the course of its 
contract. A short-term contract would thus lead to either highly inflated prices or high 
subsidies demand for potential bidders to consider the option (Shaw, 2000).   
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4. Empirical Findings 
The theoretical review explored thus far, presents several of concerns. Whether operators can 
compete effectively for the market, how the contracts are tendered and what the contracts 
entail will influence whether deregulation can overcome regulatory failures without falling 
short of the various market failures presented earlier.  
Given the government’s decision to use competitive tendering, the empirical review will 
commence with analysing experiences concerning the franchising of rail operations. The thesis 
will then move to study the different aspects of auctioning and contract design. Finally, the 
thesis will investigate whether on-rail competition should supplement competitive tendering.  
4.1 Experience with Competitive Tendering 
Competition for the market assumes that the most efficient supplier is chosen, though in 
reality, this is not always the case. Competition for the market is vulnerable for strategic 
bidding through excessively high or low bids, collusion and the winner’s curse, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters, but which nonetheless results to an 
inefficient solution. Bullish bids, through the winner’s curse or strategic bidding, may lead to 
renegotiation of contracts, higher costs than anticipated for the government and possibly 
bankruptcy for the operator. Exceedingly high subsidy bids (through collusion) result in 
operators demanding more than what is needed to run the franchise. 
Generally, there is evidence to suggest an improvement in efficiency when competitive 
tendering was introduced, relative to the benchmark case of the previous state monopolies. 
Both the UK and Sweden experienced a cost reduction of 20% (Alexandersson and Hultén, 
2008; Smith & Wheat, 2009). Evidence furthermore suggested that cost efficiencies after the 
initial rounds of tendering seemed negligible in Sweden. Similar findings were observed in 
bus tendering in Sweden (Alexandersson and Pyddoke, 2003). This indicated that competition 
for the market was effective at increasing cost efficiencies, and that these efficiencies appeared 
to be effectively exploited already in the first tendering round.  
The UK initially experienced cost savings, however soon the costs started to increase, 
implying that the initial cost savings where not sustainable. Smith and Wheat (2009) reported 
that the early improvement in productivity was driven by frontier shifts with only small 
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advances in average technical efficiency. By 2006, they argued that the cost level was more 
or less exactly where it started at privatisation. Cowie (2009) likewise reported declining 
productivity between 2001 and 2004, though by a smaller amount than Smith and Wheat. 
Overall, Cowie argued that productivity improved over the period 1998 to 2004 by 
approximately 10%. He concluded that there seemed to be a limit on the extent to which 
reduction in government subsidy could achieve efficiency through franchising.  
The difference in the results presented by Smith and Wheat (2009) and Cowie (2009) may be 
due to the later having included track access charges as one of the inputs. These are arguable 
not related to TOC productivity performance. During the analysed period, there were 
considerable changes in the way the infrastructure operator was financed, which influenced 
the track access charges. Overall, it seem reasonable to conclude that the initial cost savings 
in the UK diminished over time, and that in total, the UK experienced little to no cost 
efficiencies after introducing competition for the market.  
Cowie (2009) and Smith and Wheat (2009) are regrettably the only two studies that analyse 
the productivity development post-2000, with a sample that ends in 2006. However, a renewed 
optimism aroused from the rail value for money study regarding the cost efficiency 
development in the UK railway. One the one hand the report found a significant efficiency 
gap, with rail costs that should be 20-30% lower, but on the other hand, the report saw potential 
efficiency improvements of 30% as achievable by 2019 (Department for Transport and the 
Office of Rail Regulation, 2011). 
Johnson and Nash (2012) argue that the failure to reduce costs in Britain were due to a number 
of factors. Specifically, they identified four reasons why Britain had failed to reduce costs. 
The first reason was the market power that was obtained by the unions caused by the 
fragmented rail system. The second concerned the lack of a dominant operator after British 
Rail ceased to exist. Thirdly, they identified the willingness of the various past governments 
in Britain to renegotiate unprofitable operators as a probable cause to the resulting cost 
inefficiencies. Finally, they claimed that this was also caused by the general disruption in the 
rail industry due to events associated with the bankruptcy of Railtrack, the privatised 
infrastructure manager. These will be elaborated in some further detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
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British Rail ceased to exist after the privatisation. In the initial tendering rounds, the company 
was prohibited from bidding for franchises (Shaw, 2000). To ensure a painless transition, the 
winners of the franchises were obliged to take on existing staff at current wages and 
conditions. Hence, franchises had incentives to compete for scarce skilled labour in terms of 
wages and conditions. They knew that once the franchise was re-let, competitors would face 
the same conditions as they did. Hence, the labour unions obtained power. In Germany and 
Sweden, competitors are free to recruit their own labour, and determine the wages and 
conditions. SJ and DB, the state-owned operators, continue to operate and bid for franchises. 
The threats of competition from lower cost operators may have restrained the labour unions in 
Germany and Sweden (Johnson & Nash, 2012). 
The franchising authority had to renegotiate thirteen contracts with operators out of the twenty-
five franchises. The majority were placed under cost-plus contracts, with higher subsidy. In 
these contracts, the level of subsidy was negotiated annually based on project costs; 
consequently, the operating companies placed under these contracts thus retained some cost 
risk. Four operators had their original franchise contract renegotiated for a short period, often 
two to three years, with a higher subsidy (Smith & Wheat, 2012).  
Railtrack, the privatised infrastructure manager, was offered in a public floatation in 1996. 
The government had written off most the debt, set generous access fees and offered the 
company at £3.90 per share. Still, by 2001 it was forced into bankruptcy. The extreme 
patronage growth resulted in delays due to capacity constraints and the issue of safety sank 
Railtrack. In October 2000, four people were killed in what later has become one of the most 
cited examples to illustrate Railtrack’s failure: The Hatfield accident. A train derailed near 
Hatfield due to a cracked rail that shattered into hundreds of pieces. Railtrack had known about 
the problem and failed to fix it. In 2001, it was sold to Network Rail, a newly formed non-
profit company (Morris, 2006). 
4.2 Auction Design 
The auctions can be pure price auctions, a Beauty Contest or a hybrid. Auctioning in the rail 
industry appear more often to be that of a hybrid model, with price being a more or less the 
determining aspect, though having included some elements of a Beauty Contest 
(Alexandersson and Hultén, 2007). As such, ascending or descending multi-round auctions 
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are challenging to introduce, and the tendering processes are commonly based on sealed-bid 
(first price) auctions.  
4.2.1 Choosing the most effective supplier 
It is not given that the most efficient supplier is chosen in an auctioning process, as competitive 
tendering implies that the bidder who submits the perceived best bid win the contract, though 
whether it is indeed the most effective supplier depends on the government’s ability to select 
objectively the best supplier. The exception would be a price auction, where the winner would 
solely be determined by an algorithm, possibly by selecting the highest bid (in most cases this 
would be asking for the lowest subsidy). However, as already argued in the theoretical 
discussion, an auction if it entails some element of common value increases the chances of the 
winner’s curse.  
The tendering process as a whole varies across time and country. This includes the extent to 
which the bids are evaluated based on price and quantitative aspects, relative to qualitative 
aspects. Kain (2007) described three different phases in the development of how franchising 
policies and design evolved in the UK, which will serve as a useful benchmark to explore 
some of the issues and compromises regarding Beauty Contests and price auctions.  
Kain (2007) describes the first phase, from 1995 to 1998, as being characterised by short 
duration contracts, low specification and high-risk transfer. There was relatively little focus 
on quality and other aspects than the subsidy level (or transfer price) and the transferal of risk 
from the government to the operators. A prevalent assumption at the time was that operators 
would be able to reduce the reliance on subsidy considerably over time. Consequently, 
operators submitted optimistic bids based on a perception that strong efficiency gains and 
revenue and passenger growth would be achieved, so that they generally would require a 
declining annual subsidy or could pay a rising premium.  
Due to general dissatisfaction with the level of quality and service standard, the investment 
level and the service bundling, phase two franchising policy was introduced. This embodied a 
stronger strategic focus and intention to increase quality and investment. Nonetheless, the 
phase had unspecified objectives on performance, investment and competition much like 
Beauty Contests. The lacks of transparency regarding the scoring system lead to blind bidding 
(Modern Railways, 2003).  
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Kain (2009) argue that transparency in selection criteria is important for both franchisor and 
bidders. As the bidders did not know the weights applied to the different attributes, there is 
some doubt to whether the auction process will result in the most efficient firm being chosen. 
Partly as the various bids would be difficult to compare, and partly because one risks that the 
winning firm was the one that provided the best guess, as opposed to the most efficient 
solution. Finally, the success of competitive franchising is contingent on the winning operators 
delivering on their promise. The unspecified objectives would make a vague basis for 
monitoring contractual fulfilment.  
Alexandersson and Hultén (2005) argued that similar issues prevailed in several countries, and 
that such common secrecy practice opposes the policy of the European Union to have a 
transparent selection process. Wallis, Bray and Webster (2010) warn against the adverse 
selection that may arise in competitive tendering when elements of Beauty Contests are 
included. This would be the case if the bidder is selected based on its ability to identify and 
exploit the flaws in the evaluation of the tender and the contract documents, rather than best 
value for money. 
Phase three developed in a rather different direction, towards a high degree of specification. 
This made bids easier to compare, although it restricts entrepreneurial activities as the business 
planning is left with the franchisor. Kain (2009) argued that the specifications made it easier 
for the franchisor to establish their robustness and plausibility. Nonetheless, if the aim of 
privatisation is to capitalise the profit maximising incentives of the private sector together with 
their ability to be flexible and find innovative solutions, as described as some of the primary 
motives of the privatisation of the UK (Shaw, 2000), then the micro-management of the third 
auction process puts the whole privatisation into question. 
The emerging conclusions from research appear to be creating specific and explicit assessment 
criteria, and their weighting, available to all potential bidding firms. Evidence also suggest 
that in order to make the franchising process successful, the criteria needs to be of a nature 
that can be monitored and evaluated in retrospect. Finally, the franchisor should assess the 
required number of assessment criteria. Too many criteria may lead to micro-management, 
and constrain the opportunity to let the private sector push for innovative solutions. This is 
particularly relevant if the state wishes train operators to carry the revenue risk, such as the 
operators are required to do in the UK.  
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4.2.2 The winner’s curse and strategic bidding 
The competitive tendering of railway routes in Europe has encountered several of issues 
related to operators submitting bids that were too bullish. The key indications on this have 
been the vast amount of contracts that have been renegotiated, the level of exits and the level 
of bankruptcies of train operators in the various countries. 
Theory, as debated in previous sections in the thesis, provide three plausible explanations for 
the problems observed related to overly optimistic bidding. The first related to the winner’s 
cruse, the second the issue of moral hazard where the operators understand that its negotiation 
power increases once it has won the contract and hence submit bullish bids, and finally 
predatory pricing, in order to deter future competition. In the following sections, the two latter 
will mostly be referred to as strategic bidding.  
It is challenging to determine exactly whether a bullish bid is due to the bidders wrongly 
assessing their ability to increase revenues or decrease costs, or whether the bidders are 
strategically bidding. Nonetheless, the researches presented below suggest that in parts, this is 
indeed caused by operators bidding strategically.  
Shaw (2000) argued that there might be traces of the winner’s curse in the UK, as the bids 
from the first round of franchising would suggest that the total subsidy would decrease through 
the years of the private sector operation from £1.7 billion to £806m. Based on these ambitious 
targets, substantial increase in revenue and cost cutting would be necessary to remain 
financially feasible, which Shaw argued that seemed implausible. Inexperience was pointed 
out as one explanatory factor to the optimistic bids. This must necessarily point to the 
inexperience at both the franchisor and the operators’ part. Shaw claims that the bullish 
assumptions that would lead to such a subsidy reduction was a belief widely held by both 
operators and the authority.  
Later, when twelve operators out of the twenty-five franchises, had their contracts either 
renegotiated due to trouble or were put under management contracts, Shaw’s original disbelief 
seem largely confirmed. Smith and Wheat (2009) reported an early improvement in 
productivity of 18 percent but that this was driven by frontier shifts with only small advances 
in average technical efficiency. Regardless, the productivity declined significantly after year 
2000, and by 2006, the cost level was more or less exactly where it started before privatisation.  
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Smith and Wheat (2012) argue that the British operating companies that ran into trouble 
experiencing lower revenue growth and (in particular) lower cost reduction relative to the 
assumptions in the bids were subjects of the winner’s curse, as opposed to a deliberate strategy 
of low-balling. Cowie (2009) argued that the poor performance of some of the early franchises 
suggested the presence of winner’s curse in the British rail market, partly due to the 
inexperience of the bidders. However, he also pointed out that the poor performance may be 
caused by the strong position of the winner to renegotiate the contract.  
Kain (2009) found that British operators bid aggressively in order to secure the franchises 
and/or made bids on very unrealistic assumptions. Despite the fact that the operators’ 
experienced strong economic growth in the UK, the expected dramatically reduced subsidy 
transferal did not happen, because of the strong cost increase. Kain argued that Great Britain 
demonstrated that the authority was incapable of assessing bids to distinguish unrealistic bids 
from robust business plans. Furthermore, the commercial risk was not successfully transferred 
to the private operator. The inexperience in competitive tenders on both the government side 
and the companies’ side was another cause for the disappointing results. 
Kain (2009) argued that as the British government had shown a high propensity to rescue 
struggling operating companies, it undermined the commercial discipline so that bidders were 
not penalised for over-optimistic bids. Effectively, he argued that if it is not credible that any 
government can tolerate the collapse of a service, there is no real transfer of the risk. 
Lalive and Schmutzler (2007) argue that there was only one obvious case where the winning 
bid was being subject to the “winner’s curse” in Germany, where DB is still the dominant 
operator. The operator FlexVerkehrs AG that won the auction went bankrupt within a year 
after commencing the service in 2002. The low willingness to rescue failing operators may 
explain, partly, why Germany has had fewer occurrences of the winner’s curse.  
Similarly, Alexandersson and Hultén (2007) argue that the Swedish government have been 
able to let operators go into bankruptcy. They believe that this may have signalled to future 
bidders to estimate their bids more carefully. 
Sweden has, however, experienced that SJ has placed bids that have later resulted in great 
losses. The government has bailed SJ to avoid bankruptcy. Previously SJ had a complete 
monopoly on long-distance passenger services, which may be the reason why the government 
may feel that they could not afford SJ going bankrupt even though they placed overly 
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optimistic bids to win competitively tendered routes. SJ has been taken to court for abusing its 
dominant position by predatory bidding (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2007).  
Similarly, Kain (2007) argue that state-owned operators should be allowed to bid, if propriety 
can be assured and cross-subsidisation can be averted. The state-owned operator serves as a 
benchmark, a reality check, for authorities to identify overly optimistic bids or strategic 
bidding. Nonetheless, as with SJ, they too sometimes seem prone to bid tactically. 
Two types of strategic bidding have been observed in Sweden: one is based on the believes 
that the government will bail out certain companies, which is similar to what we have observed 
in other countries, and the second relates to larger companies abusing their financial ability to 
incur short-term losses to win a contract. In light of theory, the second seem to suggest that 
competition does indeed not start afresh, and suggest that operators bid aggressively in 
competitive tendering in the hope of obtaining an advantage later on.  
Alexandersson and Hultén (2007) pointed to winning bids for railway franchises in Sweden 
that indicated overoptimistic bids, or strategic bidding. They identified 19 tenders that 
appeared to have been based on a production-based approach. There was little uncertainty 
regarding demand and such factors, hence there was relatively little variation in these bids. In 
two bids, they found that the threshold values and discontinuous economies of scale seemed 
to be of importance, consequently leading to large variations in the bids. Finally, in six tenders, 
the information-based differences appeared to produce miscalculations and hence substantial 
difference between the bids. In at least seven tender processes, they identified bids that 
indicated strategic bidding.  
Alexandersson and Hultén (2007) argue that the reason why large oligopolistic companies are 
able to practise strategic bidding is due to these firms being less financially restricted. For the 
same reason, they claim that the larger operators are more able to endure a loss-making period 
and succeed to reach a renegotiation without a new tender, which effectively reduce the risk 
of placing low bids in the tendering process. They maintain that the CPTA6-managed firms 
may have relied on additional taxpayer money from their owners if necessary, demonstrated 
by their high share of low bids.  
                                                 
6 County Public Transport Authorities 
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A rough conclusion at this point is that the government’s inclination to renegotiate the 
contracts determines to some extent the level of overly optimistic bidding. This suggests that 
the government should not rescue struggling operators through a renegotiated contract. This 
may however, be challenging to credibly commit to. The government is constrained by a desire 
to ensure that there is a given level of service on various railway routes. When a contract is 
won by a company that incur investments and obtain significant experience, it may cost the 
government more to start a new tendering process. Hence, once the contract is obtained, the 
negotiating power of the operator increases. It appears that the British government have been 
able to somewhat reduce the amount of overly optimistic bids through successfully signalling 
that no renegotiation would take place during the third franchising round. They successfully 
held the line and did not renegotiate the contract with GNER when the incumbent failed. They 
entered into a management contract with the incumbent, whilst they almost immediately 
started the process of re-tendering the franchise. On the other hand, should a mass defaulting 
of franchise operators occur, the government may be forced to rescue the operators nonetheless 
(Preston, 2008).  
The development in the UK may also contain a component of time. The UK and Sweden were 
both nations that introduced competitive tendering early. The winner’s curse seems somewhat 
moderated after the initial tendering rounds, but it is not an extinct problem (Smith, Nash & 
Wheat, 2009). This trend is supported by theory. A new market, with limited data and 
experience, with many bidding entities, increases the possibility of the winner’s curse. 
Learning would eventually increase the bidder’s ability to make rightful assumptions, and 
decrease the risk of a winner’s curse.  
Learning on the franchisor’s part will equally increase the chances of choosing bids with sound 
but ambitious business plan, rather than bids based on faulty and overly optimistic 
assumptions. The winner’s curse may be higher when the operators have the revenue risk as 
well, in such a case, the firms may make bullish assumptions on both its ability to increase 
revenue and its ability to decrease costs, rather than purely the latter.  
Reasonably, information becomes a key factor to reduce the likelihood of the winner’s curse. 
Theory suggests that open auctions can reduce the impact of the winner’s curse because the 
various parties learn from observing other bidders valuation of the object. This implies that 
the authorities may benefit from introducing open auctions to battle the reoccurring issues of 
winner’s curse. The franchising authority may find an open ascending auction too complex, in 
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particular if aspects of a Beauty Contest are included. If this is unfeasible, it should still be 
possible to spread the tendering of contracts to various auctioning processes over time, so that 
part-taking firms and the authority have the opportunity to learn from the auctioning processes. 
Furthermore, information should be made available to all potential bidders to enable firms to 
make more sound assumptions.  
Unfortunately, the increased interaction between the firms increases the likelihood of collusion 
and strategic bidding. Nonetheless, most experience point to the winner’s curse being the 
predominant issue in the first years of privatisation, maybe combined with moral hazard. 
Hence, it is advisable to consider mitigating the risks of winner’s curse, and that this should 
be the primary motivation in the initial years. Furthermore, the government should consider 
ways to commit credibly not to renegotiating contracts with operators.  
The thesis will proceed to discuss contract design. What appears evident is that also the 
characteristics of the contracts will influence the likelihood of the winner’s curse and strategic 
bidding. This has already been touched upon briefly, as it was argued that the winner’s curse 
becomes stronger when the government also transfer the revenue risk to the operators. 
4.3 Contract Design 
Competition for the market implies that the winning operator will be the monopoly supplier 
of rail service on a given level of specified routes. Following the arguments made by Demsetz, 
competition for the market alone would be enough to prompt an efficient outcome. However, 
research suggests that contract design explains critical elements of the behaviour of the 
operating firms. Correct contract design can steer behaviour towards more efficiency and 
greater service levels. As mentioned briefly in the previous section, contract design also affects 
the chances of bullish bids. In accordance with the theory review, the contract design will 
particularly focus on the allocation of risk, contract duration and contract size.  
4.3.1 Risk allocation 
Research suggests that the choice of contract will affect the type of bidders that the authority 
attracts. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) found that management contracts damage society’s 
welfare. An efficient firm would prefer a fixed-price contract, whereas an inefficient operator 
would favour cost-plus contracts. In accordance to such schemes, the efficient firm will 
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provide the optimal effort level, whereas the inefficient operator will avoid bankruptcy, by 
satisfying its individual-rationality constraint. 
Furthermore, Piacenza (2006) found that operators under either a gross or a net contract had 
lower cost distortion than those subjected to a cost-plus contract had. Nevertheless, he also 
discovered that companies’ inefficiency to some degree was caused by the differences in 
commercial speed levels on the tracks. Thus, fixed-price subsidization became less successful 
as a mechanism to force firms to operate efficiently if the operating conditions were too 
unfavourable. 
Operators that are placed under management contracts demonstrate an inferior performance to 
that of similar operators that are placed under net contracts. Smith and Wheat (2012) 
investigated the effect of renegotiation of contracts relative to operating companies that were 
placed under management contracts. They found that operators placed under management 
contracts, experienced “a substantial and statistically significant deterioration in efficiency for 
the affected operating companies relative to best practice” (p. 44). This remained until the 
management contracts ended and a new tendering round was initiated. They found no reason 
to believe that there was any inherent difference between the operating companies that were 
placed under management contracts and the other operating companies that had to renew their 
contract.  
Management contracts seem to have damaging effects on efficiencies. In effect, it removes the 
profit maximising mentality that the private sector is known to promote, by removing any 
incentives to improve performance (Smith and Wheat, 2012). As such, management contracts 
should at best only be used whilst the government re-tender contracts should an operator fail 
to operate a service, as was done with GNER in the UK (Preston, 2008). Gross contracts and 
net contracts seem more adequate as tools to promote efficiency.  
Moreover, net contracts seemed to provide more incentives to increase quality of service than 
both gross and management contracts, as the operator benefits from increased revenues. Beck 
(2011) argued that gross contracts proved a limited impact on improving quality of service, 
almost certainly because of the lack of incentives to improve services. At best, gross contracts 
provide a low maximum bonus to reward any initiative to advance service quality.  
Gautier and Yvrande-Billon (2009) confirmed, in most parts, that high-powered incentive 
schemes are associated with a higher performance. They focused on productive efficiency and 
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found that operators that were responsible for the productive risk (i.e. costs), performed better 
than those who did not. Nonetheless, they found the observed relationship to be a non-linear 
one. If operators in addition bore the commercial risk (i.e. revenue), they had a lower 
productive efficiency. Gautier and Yvrande-Billon hypothesised that firms operating under a 
net cost contract can exert both productive and commercial effort to improve the financial 
performance. If the two are substitutes, the operators will choose to increase the commercial 
effort, at the cost of productive effort. In other words, the operator would rather invest in 
increasing the level of patronage (or the willingness to pay per passenger) than investing in 
cost-reducing measures. The data confirmed that net contract operators had a lower technical 
efficiency relative to gross contracts operators, though they did not have the appropriate data 
on commercial performances, and therefore could not confirm the second part of the 
hypothesis. 
Gautier and Yvrande-Billon’s (2009) findings may be regarded as intuitive: on the one hand, 
shareholders want a return on their investment, and as such, they want to push for efficiency 
in order to raise profits. On the other hand, managers and employees want better (or at least 
not worse) benefits and working conditions. If commercial effort and productive effort are 
substitutes, two things make it more probable that commercial investment occur. Firstly, the 
shareholders may find it easier to justify increasing service quality as opposed to reducing 
costs as the latter may negatively affect the employees. Secondly, managers might chose on 
their own accord to promote commercial effort of the same reasons, though their reward would 
be bonuses rather than dividend and increased share prices. This is a highly streamlined image, 
as the franchise contract, pressure groups and labour unions etc. may influence the outcome 
too. Nonetheless, it provides some understanding for the outcomes presented by Gautier and 
Yvrande-Billon.  
Net contracts seem to invite more operators to be a victim of the winner’s curse. Introducing 
net contracts mean that the government intend to transfer the commercial risk as well to the 
operators, but in many cases they seem unable to successfully do so, which reduces the risk 
faced by operators to submit optimistic bids based on bullish assumptions (Kain, 2009). As 
mentioned in 4.2.2, net contracts allow more room to make wrong assumptions, as the bidders 
now have to make assumptions concerning both revenues and costs. Some of the wrongly 
calculated assumptions can also be explained by the low quality of information concerning 
demand that is available to the firms when submitting bids (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2006B). 
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In such cases, operators should include a risk premium in the bids, which they appear not to 
have done in some cases.  
Alexandersson and Hultén (2007) found that the deviation between bids had risen in Sweden 
in the tendering of net contracts in recent years, a trend they did not find in gross contracts. 
Alexandersson, Nash and Preston (2008) found that net contracts in Great Britain appeared 
problematic. They argue that the consequences of suffering from the winner’s curse become 
more apparent in contracts where the winner is required to bear the losses for a long period. 
Thus, the introduction of the “cap and collar” regime in the UK can reduce the likelihood of 
the winner’s curse. Moreover, they have found competition for the franchises to increase with 
such a regime.  
The cap and collar mechanism in the UK was introduced in the Railways Act in 2005. Under 
this regime, the actual revenue of an operator for a given year is compared with the target 
revenue forecast in the original bid. If revenue falls below given targets, the shortfall will be 
covered partly or mostly by the Department for Transportation. However, the operator will 
typically only be entitled revenue support from year five onwards. On the other hand, the 
operator is obliged to pay revenue share to the department if the revenue exceeds 102 % of 
predicted revenues (Competition and Markets Authority, 2015). 
The risk allocation between the government and the operators may influence the level of 
competition. Beck (2011) argued that two key conditions could influence the likelihood of 
potential firms to submit a bid: The share of price risk assumed by the public authority for 
input factors and to what extent revenue risk will be carried by the operator. When the 
authority assumes a higher share of price risk on the input factors, particularly concerning 
infrastructure and personnel cost, as well as energy costs; the number of bids increases. The 
number of bidders decrease, if the authority oblige the operator to assume a higher (or all of 
the) revenue risk. Beck found that the more risk the operator is exposed to the lower the level 
of competition, and higher the risk premium calculated in the bid. These were the only 
effective entry barriers uncovered in the analysis. 
In the theory section, it was argued that the responsible party for the risk should assume that 
risk. However, as outlined in section 3.3. the commercial revenue risk entails components that 
the operators can and cannot influence. Economic growth, the quality of substitutes, changes 
in demography and urbanization are all exogenous factors that the train operator cannot 
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influence. There are also costs that are outside of the operators’ control, such as fuel prices 
and general wages development. The dilemma then becomes whether it is the government or 
the train operator that should carry that risk. In terms of responsibility for the risk, neither the 
government, nor the operators are able to control the risk. A possible argument is that the 
private operator still will be able to control even exogenous cost developments to some extent. 
For example can an increase in general wages lead an operator to become more capital 
intensive and/or reduce the amount of staffing on trains. It was argued in 4.1. that franchising 
appeared to have increased cost efficiencies, which suggest that allowing operators to carry 
this risk increases efficiency. However, there is more doubt whether any increase in patronage 
can be attributed to franchising, which cast doubt on whether the transferal of revenue risk is 
worthwhile. 
Preston (2008) distinguishes between short-distance commuter services and regional services 
that have little potential of being commercial on the one hand, and inter-city services that may 
hold the possibility of being profitable on the other. He argues that taxpayers are entitled to 
expect that the prior group, which is heavily subsidised, have thorough specifications, and 
suggest that these could be served through gross contracts. He views the latter group as 
operators that could effectively be entitled to keep the revenue as incentives to invest in 
technology and techniques as he believes that these may increase the number of passengers 
and hence revenues.  
It appears to be several of factors to consider when determining whether one should use gross 
or net contracts. If the authority is successful at distinguishing bids that are based on bullish 
and unrealistic assumptions, or bids that are indeed strategically low or high, then a net 
contract could arguably be the better alternative. Gautier and Yvrande-Billon’s (2009) 
research suggest that even when the franchisor is able to distinguish “healthy” bids from 
“unhealthy” bids, operators under net contracts does seem to prioritise increased revenue 
rather than reducing costs. Hence, if the key objective of privatisation is to increase cost 
efficiency, gross contracts seem to be the best alternative. If the government is more indifferent 
between cost efficiency and quality improvements, net contracts could be a viable solution. 
This would particularly be the case on routes where the authority believes that investments in 
quality could increase the number of passengers. However, as most empirical experience 
suggests that the franchisor is indeed unable to distinguish the soundness of the bids, gross 
contracts may still be the best alternative. 
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4.3.2 Contract duration 
There is less agreement, and less empirical research around the effect the duration of the 
contract has. One the one hand, the many defaulted contracts and cases of renegotiation have 
made research challenging, and on the other hand, parts of discussion is related to which 
factors one should prioritise.  
One argument that is agreed upon is that due to the high costs associated with the auctioning 
process the contract duration, when viewed in isolation, should be long. This would allow for 
the costs associated with competitive tendering to be divided over a longer period of time, 
which would, all things equal make it more attractive to part-take. For example, the train 
operators claim that they spend up to £5 million per franchise bid, and the Department of 
Transport suggests that their costs are around £2.5 million. As an indication (though it is 
maybe naïve to think that the operators would be entirely honest), this suggest that the costs 
are considerable. On the other hand, relative to the annual turnover of the passenger rail 
industry, it is modest.  
Preston (2008) found a franchising round overall to cost approximately £472.5 million, with 
the annual turnover of the rail business being £5.7 billion in 2005/06 (including revenue 
support). Merkert (2009) concentrated on the issue of transaction cost dynamics in franchised 
passenger train operators in Britain from 1996/1997 to 2007/2008. He claimed that transaction 
costs had grown considerably faster than operating costs. Furthermore, he suggested that 
optimal contract duration in the UK, with respect to transaction costs, would be 5 years and 4 
months, which was independent of whether it was a management, gross or net contract.  
On the other hand, there are compelling arguments founded in theory, which states that all 
things equal, a longer contract gives the operator more opportunity to create barriers to enter 
which can damage competition later. Furthermore, long intervals between competitions make 
it difficult for operators that do not win a contract to stay in the market, hence again decreasing 
competition in subsequent period. This is related to some of the inconsistency in the definition 
of bidding markets by the European Commission. Because the contracts entail significant 
investment and operators gain significant experience, competition does not necessarily start 
afresh. Moreover, the longer the period between each competition the harder it is for potential 
competitors to survive without a contract.  
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When Alexandersson and Hultén (2007) found that large firms were more likely to place either 
very high or very low bids, this may be to deter future competition of exactly the 
aforementioned reasons. Unrealistic bids forced smaller firms into bankruptcy, whereas deep 
pockets and other resources gave an advantage to large firms in the case of unrealistic low 
bids.  
On the other hand, Nash and Smith (2008) argue that competition remain healthy in the 
franchises that have been refranchised so far, with some operators having left the market, and 
new entrants having arrived. Of the twelve franchises they analysed that had been refranchised, 
only three had gone to the main incumbent. However, many incumbents continued to operate, 
having won different franchises. Similarly, Alexandersson and Hultén (2007) found that it was 
often difficult for the incumbents to keep their contracts when they are re-tendered. However, 
this was also contingent on whether the contract was gross cost or net cost. In the former, they 
found that the incumbent was able to defend only 39 per cent, whereas in the latter case, the 
incumbent succeeded in 70 per cent of the tendered contracts.   
One explanation why new entrants often seem to win the franchise may be that entrants bid 
aggressively to win contracts. On the other hand, it may be the selection bias, i.e. the winner’s 
curse. The incumbent, knowing the revenues and costs, make realistic assumptions, but the 
new entrant submit a winning bid based on bullish assumptions. The final finding from 
Alexandersson and Hultén (2007) suggests that the higher complexity of net contracts raises 
the entry barriers. Furthermore, as net contracts tend to be of a longer duration than gross 
contracts, this suggests that length may indeed partly determine the level of competition.  
The arguments made so far imply that when transaction costs are high, the contract duration 
should be increased. However, on the other hand, competition appears to increase when the 
contract period is shorter. If transaction costs are considered unimportant, and the aim is to 
increase competition for each route, and/or prevent operators creating entry barriers, contracts 
duration should be made short.  
The actual duration of contract, vary across the different countries. In the UK, contracts are 
normally between 7 and 15 years. The norm is a seven-year contract, with an option to extend 
for a further three (Nash, Nilsson & Link, 2011). The franchises that last for 15 years involve 
a higher degree of commitment through investment obligations (Affuso & Newbery 2000, 
Shaw 2000). In Sweden, contracts are currently between three and nine years (Nash et al., 
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2011). The contracts used, however, to last between one and five years (Monami 2000). As 
the contracts employed by the different local authorities in Germany vary greatly, so does the 
contract length. The duration may vary from two years to up to 15 (Nash et al., 2011).  
The differences in contracts in some respect can be viewed in regards to whether net or gross 
contracts are employed, and what incentive mechanisms follow. Sweden primarily uses gross 
contracts where the quality is specified by the authorities. As such, the contracts limit the scope 
for innovation by the private sector. As the authority’s main goal becomes to ensure 
compliance with the contract, the threat of losing the next tendering round provides the needed 
incentive to operate in accordance with the contract. Thus, gross contracts may benefit from 
being reviewed often. As net contracts also transfer the revenue risk of operators, Preston 
(2008) imply that the contracts should be longer in order to allow companies to make 
investments to increase patronage. A related argument would be that as the operators carry 
both the revenue and cost risk, there is already a strong incentive for the operator to comply 
with the contract. Overall, this relationship between risk allocation and duration may explain 
why countries that predominantly or only utilize net contracts have longer contracting periods 
than countries that predominantly operate with gross contracts.  
Relating to the argument regarding contract length and investment, there seem to be diverting 
opinions on whether contract duration should be short or long to encourage investment. On 
the one hand, longer contracts may make it more attractive for operators to invest. This is 
related to the argument in the previous paragraph. The operators could lease the hardware from 
other companies that own rolling stock, whether it is a government owned or privately owned 
company, or one could include sellback clauses, but this would nevertheless only resolve the 
issues of investment occurred in hardware (rolling stocks, stations and other tangible assets). 
If the operator invests in intangible assets, particularly if they operate under net contracts, to 
build a strong brand, to market their services, to perform market studies to understand the 
customers, etc. these costs are not easily compensated. Monami (2000) argue that if the 
authority wish for such investments to occur, the contract length need to be sufficient to cover 
the costs of the investment.  
On the other hand, shorter contracts increase the threat of losing the contract, which increases 
the incentives for operators to invest to signal their commitment to the rail services. When 
investigating the level of investment over and above the contract specification, Affuso and 
Newbery (2000) found that the coefficient of contract length was negative, contrary to their 
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(stated) prior belief. The coefficient was significantly different from zero. This implies that 
shorter contracts generate higher rates of investment. They argued that the operators behaved 
strategically, by delaying investment to near the end of the franchise to increase the prospect 
of having the contract re-awarded. This would also effectively provide a first-mover advantage 
and increase the entry cost for potential bidders. 
Effectively, the arguments resemble those of the carrot and stick. On the one hand, a long 
contract may provide the carrot to investors to enable them to be awarded for the investments 
they incur. On the other hand, shorter contracts work similarly to the stick by forcing operators 
to invest in quality improvement in fear of losing the contract (Lien, 2015). There seem to be 
no agreement on whether the one or the other is the correct approach. In addition, it seems to 
depend on whether the authority prefers to use gross or net contracts.  
Preston (2008) for example suggests that net contracts should be loosely specified, long 
duration franchises. Gross contracts on the other hand should be tightly specified and short 
term. 
The ideal contract length will be determined in part also by whether the rolling stock is 
provided by the state or if the private operator is responsible for providing this. Rolling stock 
has an estimated lifetime of 30 years (Meld. St. 27), hence if the operator is expected to provide 
this they would require a risk premium, whether they lease it through a third party or invest 
directly in the rolling stock. The operator may have stock with considerable residual value if 
the contract is not re-awarded (Affuso and Newbery 2000; Monami 2000). On the other hand, 
this latter argument depends on whether there are effective second markets for rolling stock. 
This is rarely the case in initial contracting rounds.   
As illustrated through theory, supplemented by empirical findings, there are diverting views 
on the impact that contract duration has on the investment level in the industry. A long contract 
reduces uncertainty for the operating companies and provides incentives to invest. On the other 
hand, a short contract encourages investment through the threat of not renewing the contract 
with the operator.  
4.3.3 Contract size 
Finally, the contract size is a vital aspect of the contract design. As deliberated in theory, one 
key argument favouring competition for the market is that few operators operating on separate 
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routes may achieve greater cost efficiencies than several operators competing heads-on. 
Hence, determining what the contract size of each franchise should be is one key determinant 
for the franchise success. Essentially, one needs to assess is how many rail kilometres, what 
geographical area, and whether these contracts should include passenger and freight traffic, or 
if these should be tendered separately. The analysis will include a consideration of economies 
of scale and density. Additionally, economies of scope need to be evaluated. Finally, the 
discussion will also consider transactional costs. 
In theory of rail, it was identified that the railway market is characterised by some economies 
of scale, though at large, most operators seem to operate at a constant return to scale. It is only 
the largest and smallest operators that experience decreasing or increasing return to scale. 
Nonetheless, it is the presence of economies of density in the rail industry that suggests that 
heads-on competition is undesirable, and that as such, one should attempt to reduce the amount 
of franchises that have overlapping tracks. Furthermore, minimizing the amount of 
overlapping tracks may reduce coordination costs between operators. It may also reduce the 
externality concerning the impact of delay to one serving on the running of other operators, as 
identified in section 3.1.  
Wheat and Smith (2015) found that in the UK in later years, there has been a rationalisation 
to larger franchises. They claimed that for large train operating companies, this appeared to 
increase costs, which is consistent with Preston’s (1996) argument. Irrespective of size, all 
train operators experienced increasing return to density, implying a decreased unit cost. One 
could imagine that the rationalisation to larger franchises hence was motivated by decreasing 
costs caused by density economies outweighing (possible) diseconomies of scale. 
Nonetheless, in their case studies, two of the three rationalisations7, resulted (or would result) 
in increased, not decreased unit costs. Alexandersson (2010) found that the importance of scale 
economies was exaggerated in the railway industry. This might explain why the diseconomies 
appeared to outweigh any potential density benefit.  
                                                 
7 Two that had occurred and one hypothetical 
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Although there is some inconsistency in the findings, European (and Japanese) studies on 
railway suggest diseconomies of scope. Hence, passenger and freight services may possibly 
benefit from being operated by separate companies (Preston, 1996; Alexandersson 2010).  
The size of the contracts may also work as a barrier to entry for smaller firms if the contract is 
too large, and reduce the level of competition for the market. Sizeable contracts may require 
investments over and above what is feasible for all but large firms and the incurred investment 
by incumbents will serve as an entry barrier at a new franchising round. Furthermore, as 
discussed in theory of competition for the market, the more significant the contract is for the 
operator, the more difficult it is for the competition to start afresh (both being assumptions for 
ideal bidding markets). This is both due to the aforementioned reasons, but learning and 
experience may also play a part. The effect on raising entry barriers may particularly be the 
case if net contracts are used.  
Van Dijk (2007) suggested that the smaller franchises resulted in small and medium sized 
companies being able to offer passenger services for these franchises in the Netherlands, 
enabling competition for the franchises. Another related argument is that smaller contracts 
may translate into more competition, as there will be more operators at all times present in the 
market (each with its own franchise).  
The previous argument may suggest that contracts should be small, though factoring in that 
there are some scale economies, they should be moderately small. An added benefit is that if 
an operator should default, there would be less consequences and costs associated with it as 
the size of the contract would be relatively small.  
The issue of this argument relates to the costs associated with auctioning. As discussed 
previously, Preston (2008) found that train operators spend up to £5 million per franchise bid. 
Kain (2007) found these to be smaller, around £2-4 million around the change of millennium. 
Whichever is correct in today’s market matters less than the overall understanding that 
operators pay a significant share to bid for a contract. Additionally, there are costs associated 
with developing and auctioning the contracts from the authority’s side. Although one may 
argue that the absolute costs per bid from the operators perspective may decrease somewhat 
when the size of the contract falls (less complexity perhaps), there is a fair chance that the 
costs may increase for the government (added complexity of having to develop more contracts, 
the added issue of more companies to coordinate etc). All things equal, costs will favour 
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having larger contracts. Overall, there seem to be arguments favouring both small and large 
contracts.  
In practise, there seem to be substantial differences in contract size. The UK have contracts 
comprising 26.5 million train kilometres on average, relative to 3.3 million train kilometres in 
Germany and 2.65 train kilometres in Sweden (Nash et al., 2011). The UK, on the other hand 
is the only country that franchise all of their contracts. This may be the reason why they have 
used longer contracts. On the other hand, there is little to suggest that the UK operators have 
been able to exploit the scale advantages, when one considers the development in cost 
efficiency. 
4.4 On-Track Competition as a Supplement to Competitive 
Tendering 
Johnson and Nash (2012) saw the potential for on-track competition to solve the failures of 
competition for the market in the UK. New entrants would be able to determine the working 
practices, wages and conditions, which the incumbent franchising operators could not. They 
therefore expected new entrants to have lower costs, which in turn could pressure the 
incumbents to improve costs. They still raised the concern of the entrant simply diverting 
existing traffic from the incumbent and what role the economies of density would play.  
Preston, Wardman and Whelan (1999) modelled the effects of competition between operators 
to assess the consequences of allowing for on-track competition. They based their model on a 
case study for busy intercity routes in Britain, which had around 2 million end-to-end 
passenger journeys per year. They analysed four different scenarios for duopolistic on-rail 
competition and found that the only commercially feasible option that did not reduce social 
welfare was that the new entrant offered a lower quality, cheaper service. In such an instant, 
the entrant would capture a significant market niche, the peak hour non-business travellers. In 
all other cases, whether it be cream-skimming, fare reductions (price war) or heads-on 
competition (entrant match service frequency) the strategies where either not profitable or it 
reduced overall welfare. The latter would imply that the benefits to the passengers did not 
offset the increased operating costs of the additional services. 
The incumbent and the entrant were assumed to have the same variable costs. Furthermore, it 
was assumed that competition in the market would be unable to drive the costs down, which 
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were presumed efficient from competitive tendering (Johnson & Nash, 2012). This assumption 
may be faulty as the cost began to rise shortly after this study was published. Rising costs in 
Great Britain may be due to peculiar characteristics of the British railway, which makes it 
infeasible to achieve sustaining cost reductions or it may be because competition for the 
market failed to realise feasible cost reductions. In the latter case, the assumption would be 
faulty.  
Despite the presence of returns to density and scale economics in the industry, the open access 
operators appears in reality to lower average costs of train provision on important routes in 
Britain. Rasmussen, Wheat and Smith (2015) found that “there are small to no cost 
disadvantages of allowing open access operators to compete with franchised operators and in 
some cases there are cost advantages of doing so”. Fundamentally, the lower costs seem to be 
due to lower input prices and what Rasmussen et al. identify as a potential “open access 
business model” effect. This could for example be the ability to negotiate their own terms in 
regards to wages. For some routes Rasmussen et al. found that it might be a potential to lower 
overall costs if services are switched from incumbent to open access, even weighted up against 
the lost scale and density benefits for the former. 
Johnson and Nash (2012) argued that on-rail competition is a doubtful way to increase cost 
efficiencies in rail services, except from in Britain, where costs had increased after the 
introduction of competitive tendering. If this is not due to specific peculiarities of the British 
rail system, competition in the market may drive the cost down.  
In conclusion, empirical analysis from the UK appears somewhat undecided about the cost 
efficiency of allowing competition in the market, due to the unclear impact on cost efficiency. 
On the one hand, loss of economies of density drives costs up, on the other the open access 
operators can force incumbents to strive for cost efficiencies if this is not successfully achieved 
through competition for the market.  
There has been relatively little experience with open access operators outside the UK. The 
open access operators in Germany have entered markets that Deutsche Bahn (DB) has closed 
due to the lack of profitability. Beckers, von Hirschhausen, Haunerland and Walter (2009) 
found that nine attempts had been made to enter the market, with five ceasing to exist shortly 
thereafter. Four lines, however, are still served by small-scale operators, which operates 
profitably, despite DB’s failing to do so. In Germany, the open access operators are not 
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competing heads-on as they do in the UK, i.e. they are in reality not competing in the market. 
They operate lines that are no longer served by DB, which imply that they still can exploit the 
economies of density.  
An experiment with on-the track competition in the Netherlands came into effect after private 
company Lovers Rail asked for permission to add services on some lines already operated by 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS). The initiative lasted from 1996-99 when the new entrant went 
bankrupt. Alexandersson and Hultén (2006A) argue that even though the company went 
bankrupt the mere threat of more entry into the network made NS expand and improve its 
service in these areas.  
These arguments resemble that of the contestable markets, where the mere threat of entry 
forced operators to operate efficiently. Because there nevertheless are some entry barriers, it 
is questionable how substantial this threat in reality is. Nonetheless, it appears that competition 
in the market in many cases is fruitless. Although it is questionable if competition in the market 
is a reasonable alternative to competition for the market in the majority of cases, some 
experience suggests that it may not be harmful to allow such competition to happen. 
Competition in the market may force operators to strive for efficiency to avoid such 
competition actually taking place, provided that competition for the market fail to fully exploit 
efficiencies. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether any model has achieved optimal cost efficiency 
through competitive tendering. One the one hand, research show that the introduction of 
competitive tendering led to a fall in the level of subsidy required by various operators to run 
the service. On the other hand, as deliberated in previous sections, operators have suffered 
from the winner’s curse, and/or they have behaved strategically, suggesting that competitive 
tendering in some way have failed to ensure the most efficient distribution.  
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5. FINDINGS 
This thesis has deconstructed theory and research relating to various elements in the 
deregulation of the railway industry. The findings contribute to answer how the Rail 
Directorate can assess different auction processes and contract designs when introducing 
(some form of) competition. Essentially, the findings can be broken down to key learning 
points and key trade-offs that will be summarized in the following sections. 
5.1 Key learning points 
I. Competition for the market through competitive tendering of franchises has, broadly 
speaking, increased cost efficiency. 
The UK has largely proved the exception to the rule, though initially, also British rail operators 
increased their cost efficiency. The thesis has explored several of reasons why the UK 
experienced so different results from other European countries. Some of these contributing 
variables have provided additional learning points that are of general appliance. 
II. Being obligated to take over the staff at current wages and conditions lowers 
incentives to be efficient and increases the labour unions’ negotiation power. 
Germany and Sweden avoided this issue as SJ and DB continued to operate. Competitors were 
allowed to hire staff at their own conditions and with the ability to offer the wages they wanted. 
This reduced the negotiation power of the labour unions and increased incentives for 
employees in the competing firms to be efficient.  
III. The propensity of opportunistic behaviour increases with governments that are 
willing to renegotiate contracts. 
Despite the political difficulty of allowing train operators to go bankrupt, empirical evidence 
indicate time and again that renegotiation is damaging, and that operators do change their 
attitude to risk when governments are willing to renegotiate. The government need to commit 
credibly to allow operators to go bankrupt if they want to reduce the chances of unrealistic, 
bullish bids. This includes a potential dominant state-owned company. NSB will continue to 
compete for services, which makes the latter part vital. Empirical evidences indicate that if the 
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government willingly bail the state-owned operator, that operator will, just as any firm, bid 
opportunistically.  
IV. Assessment criteria in competitive tendering of franchises should be specific and 
explicit, including the weighting of the different criteria. This should be available to 
all potential bidding firms. 
Price auctions are generally preferred in terms of political controversy as a mean to auction 
railway contracts. However, price auctions have seldom been used in its purest form in rail 
auctioning because of the complex nature of the franchises. Hence, the common auctioning 
process is a hybrid form: An auction including some elements resembling a Beauty Contest. 
In order to mitigate issues of (perceived) favouritism and corruption, as well as providing a 
well-defined basis for monitoring contract fulfilment, assessment criteria and their weighting 
should be specified and made available.  
 
V. The chance of the winner’s curse is higher in initial rounds or with inexperienced 
bidders. 
Theory and empirical experience both imply that the winner’s curse is more prominent in 
initial rounds due to limited data and limited experience on the behalf of the competing firms 
and the authority. Learning will increase the bidder’s ability to make correct calculations.  
VI.  Information should be made available to all potential bidding firms. 
Following the previous arguments, information can reduce the chance of the overly optimistic 
bidding. Information will enable the competing firms to make calculations based on sound 
assumptions 
VII. Management contracts damage society’s welfare. 
Empirical researches indicate that management contracts leave little incentive to increase 
productive nor commercial efficiency. At best, management contracts may only be used whilst 
the authority re-tendered an unsuccessful franchise contract.  
VIII. Net contracts deter market entry more than gross contracts. 
In the case of net contracts, empirical evidence suggests that the incumbents, in the majority 
of the cases, are able to re-win the contract once re-tendered. With gross contracts, 
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nevertheless, the incumbents seem less able to succeed in defending the re-tendered 
contracts.   
IX. Net contracts should be loosely specified and should have a relatively long duration. 
Gross contracts should be tightly specified and of a short duration.  
Empirical experience suggest that gross and net contracts influence and incentivise different 
behaviour, and thus contract specification and duration should be partly determined by this. 
Net contracts on the one hand delegate most of the upside revenue and risk to the operators, 
which disciplines the operators. In gross contracts, on the other hand, the government retains 
some of the upside and risk, hence the operators require some additional discipline in terms 
of more specification and shorter contract duration. 
5.2 Key trade-offs 
I. The chance of the winner’s curse is lower when competing firms can observe each 
other’s behaviour. However, this increases the chances of collusion.  
An open auction may reduce the risk of winner’s curse. This may be particular advantageous 
for price auctions, as the risk of winner’s curse is higher in such a format. It appears that 
ascending open auctions are also less demanding to employ in a price auction design. 
Open ascending formats may be unduly complex when aspects of a Beauty Contest are 
included, which may well be why most railway auctions are organised as a sealed-bid first 
price auction. Still, the issue of winner’s cruse appears to be present, particularly in the initial 
rounds. Hence, the objective may still be to reduce the chance of winner’s curse, rather than 
reducing collusive behaviour. In a sealed-bid auction, this is made possible by spreading the 
tendering of contracts to various auctions over time. Regrettably, this increases the chance of 
collusion as the various firms meet repeatedly. 
II. The number of requirements specified in the auctioning process need to balance so 
that it ensures a minimum level of quality and control, but does not lead to excessive 
micro-management.  
In Beauty Contests, firms are evaluated on more aspects than price. Even in price auctions, the 
authority decides on minimum requirements needed. However, there is a balance between 
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ensuring a certain level of service, and micro-management. An excessive amount of criteria 
may inhibit the opportunity for private and public operators to advance innovative solutions. 
III. Net contracts appear to improve commercial effort only, and gross contract seem to 
improve productive effort. 
Experience suggests that net contracts and gross contracts provide operators with incentives 
to increase efficiency, which makes them better alternatives than management contracts. 
Nonetheless, net contracts are believed to increase the incentives to improve service quality, 
but research suggests that generally operators do little to improve cost efficiency. This is 
despite both the cost and revenue risks being allocated to the operating firm. Gross contracts, 
where the revenue risk remains with the franchising authority, appear to incentivise operators 
to increase cost efficiencies. Empirical research furthermore seems to suggest that net 
contracts increase the chances of the winner’s curse. There are more assumptions, and hence 
more room to make overly optimistic ones.  
IV. A longer contract duration enables operators to lower the transaction costs. 
Additionally, it reduces the uncertainty for operating companies, which may increase 
incentives to invest. A shorter contract duration ensures that the frequency of 
competition is higher, which increases the ability for competition to discipline 
operators. Furthermore, a shorter contract duration encourages operating 
companies to invest through the threat of non-renewal of the contract. 
In parts, contract duration can be determined by whether the franchise is based is a gross or 
net contract. There are stronger incensements to investment in quality improvement under a 
net contract favouring longer contracts. There are diverging views on whether long or short 
contracts encourage or discourage investment. 
V. The contract size is conflicted by, on the one hand, the desire to exploit economies of 
density, scale and minimise transactional costs, and, on the other, the desire to allow 
for more competition. 
Larger contracts imply fewer companies may be able to bid for contracts and that there will 
be fewer companies operating routes on the national railway. Nonetheless, larger contracts 
imply better exploitation of economies of scale and possibly density. Larger contracts also 
reduce transactional costs. One option is to introduce smaller contracts in the initial round of 
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competitive tendering. When operators gain experience and build up stock (and potentially 
capital) the regulator can chose to reduce the number of franchises. 
VI. Competition in the market can be used as a supplement to competition for the market. 
It may increase unit costs due to the presence of economies of density, but if 
competition for the market does not discipline the operators, competition in the 
market may.  
Having in-market competition as a supplement to competitive tendering depends on the one 
hand on whether the latter is expected to achieve efficiencies, and on the other hand, it depends 
whether the average costs of operations are similar for the new entrants and the incumbent. If 
the government believes that competition for the market brings out full efficiencies and that 
entrants would operate at a similar cost base (or higher – due to the loss of scale economics), 
then additional in-market competition would be harmful. Otherwise, the picture is more 
ambiguous, though research suggests that in-market competition in such cases could provide 
benefits above any cost disadvantage of allowing on-rail competition.  
The learning points and the trade-offs outlined suggest that with aligned decisions, the 
government may be able to achieve the objectives of the deregulation. However, the handling 
of the deregulation is of outmost importance. This thesis aims to be of guidance on the various 
decision variables and their implication, given the accumulated experiences of other nations.  
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6. APPEDIX  
6.1 MPG Illusion 
 
Figure 1 Relationship between MPG and gas consumption 
Source: Larrick and Soll (Science 2008) 
 
6.2 The Volkswagen Scandal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Newspaper Articles of the Recent Scandal 
Source: the Telegraph, the New York Times and the Financial Times 
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